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Choice of Forum Clauses in
International and Interstate Contracts
By JAMES T. GILBERT*
Party autonomy has long been recognized in contractual
choice of law provisions, but not in contractual forum selection
provisions. Mr. Gilbert analyzes judicial treatment of the at-
tempts by private contracting parties to limit dispute resolu-
tion to a particular forum in the interstate and international
context and identifies a trend to effectuate the parties' choice
under certain circumstances. The author further discusses the
relationship of choice of forum and choice of law, both by con-
sidering the effect this relationship has, or should have, on the
determination whether to allow the choice of forum provision
to be effective, and by pointing out potential problems of con-
stitutional dimension in the relationship. Mr. Gilbert calls for
a more thorough judicial analysis of the choice of law implica-
tions of forum selecting provisions through a policy centered
approach.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the context of international and interstate contracts,'
choice of forum clauses may be extremely useful devices, and
consequently, their occurrence is relatively common. 2 Such a
clause provides that the litigation of any dispute arising out of
the contract shall be initiated exclusively in the courts of State
X and that such stipulation is to be distinguished from a sim-
ple consent to jurisdiction. In the view of the parties to the
contract, the usefulness, and therefore the desirability, of a
choice of forum provision is obvious: there are numerous inher-
ent uncertainties for all involved when dealing and contracting
across international, or even state, boundaries, and any device
which tends to render multinational or multistate transactions
less uncertain is sure to reduce the complexity, if not the incid-
ence, of disputes and result in a greater feeling of security on
behalf of the parties and more stability in the entire transac-
tion.'
A choice of forum clause may provide more certainty in
several respects. First, it can obviate a jurisdictional struggle
between the courts of nations or states which in fact have per-
sonal jurisdiction by selecting a single forum to hear and deter-
mine all disputes under a given contract. Parties will be well
I For the purpose of this paper, the term "international contract" or "interstate
contract" will be given a broad meaning; viz., any legally enforceable private agree-
ment with multinational or multistate aspects, including those with (a) parties of
diverse nationality or state citizenship, (b) extranational or extrastate subject matter,
(c) extranational or extrastate execution, or (d) extranational or extrastate perform-
ance.
2 Nadelman, The Hague Conference on Private International Law and the Valid-
ity of Forum Selecting Clauses, 13 AM. J. CoMP. L. 157 (1964).
3 See Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 Tx. L. REv. 657, 674 (1959):
"[R]easonable certainty is of the utmost importance to the parties and needless
uncertainty serves neither private nor state interests."
[Vol. 65
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aware of where they will have to go should a disagreement arise
and can thus plan in advance. Second, it is a flexible device
which allows parties to tailor the dispute resolution mechanism
to their particular situation. They may select a forum which is
convenient for both sides; they may choose a forum because of
its neutrality, or because of its expertise in the particular sub-
ject matter of the contract. Further, a choice of forum clause
may act to "complement" a specific choice of law, thereby
permitting the chosen court to interpret and apply its own law,
presumably because it is better suited to do so than any other
court.
Since forum selection clauses are desirable from the stand-
point of the parties to the international or interstate transac-
tion because of the resulting added stability, they also tend to
encourage trade by negating the fear of the vagaries of unfamil-
iar and fortuitous foreign courts. 5 This relative certainty is an
extremely important element in the formulation of private in-
ternational and interstate agreements. In fact, one commenta-
tor has gone so far as to declare that "advance determination
of the forum is the best method of avoiding jurisdictional con-
troversies in an age which has not yet developed a truly inter-
national jurisdiction."" It is little wonder then that choice of
forum provisions are quite routinely found in multinational or
multistate contracts.
A note on this article's concern with both international
and interstate contracts is in order here. The conceptual ana-
lyses underlying decisions involving both types of contracts are
remarkably similar, although, as will become evident later,
I Reese, A Proposed Uniform Choice of Forum Act, 5 CoLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L LAW
193, 196 (1966). See also Farquharson, Choice of Forum Clauses-A Brief Survey of
Anglo-American Law, 8 INT'L. LAWYER 83, 85, 99-100 (1974); Scoles, Interstate and
International Distinctions in Conflict of Laws in the United States, 54 CALIF. L. REv.
1599, 1620-21 (1966); Traynor, supra note 3, at 674.
5 1 A. EHRENZWEI, CONFLICT OF LAWS 149, 151-52 (1962) [hereinafter cited as
EHRENZWEIG]; Casenote, 11 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L LAW 449, 453 (1972).
1 Lenhoff, The Parties' Choice of a Forum: "Prorogation Agreements," 15 RuTGER-S
L. REv. 414 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Lenhoff.] The same, of course, can be said of
interstate jurisdiction in the United States, although perhaps to a lesser extent. But
it cannot be denied that concepts such as "transient jurisdiction" are instrumental in
adding instability and uncertainty to multistate transactions. See Ehrenzweig, The
Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth and Forum Conveniens,
65 YALE L.J. 289 (1956).
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whether a transaction has an international aspect may be rele-
vant to determine the "reasonableness" of the choice of court
provision. Also, decisions of both state and federal courts are
significant in this context and will be considered herein. Fed-
eral courts, of course, have original jurisdiction where a "fed-
eral question" is involved, as, for example, an action arising
under a federal statute.7 In some instances, the jurisdiction
would be concurrent with state courts.8 Of course, even if it is
exclusively a state law issue such as a dispute arising under a
sales contract, the defendant could normally remove the action
to federal district court based on diversity of citizenship9 in the
usual international or interstate contract case. But in diversity
the federal court under the Erie doctrine"0 would be obliged to
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970). Generally, the amount in controversy must exceed
$10,000 in order for federal question jurisdiction to obtain. However, there are numer-
ous statutory exceptions through which Congress has authorized district court jurisdic-
tion to be exercised without regard to the amount in controversy, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1333
(admiralty and maritime actions); 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (bankruptcy matters and proceed-
ings); 28 U.S.C. § 1336 (review of certain Interstate Commerce Commission orders);
28 U.S.C. § 1337 (actions arising under federal statutes regulating commerce or anti-
trust matters); 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (actions involving patents, copyrights, and trade-
marks); 28 U.S.C. § 1339 (postal matters); 28 U.S.C. § 1340 (actions concerning federal
revenue laws); 28 U.S.C. § 1344 (certain election dispute actions); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1345-
49, 1358, and 1361 (actions in which the United States is a party); 28 U.S.C. § 1350
(certain alien's actions for torts); 28 U.S.C. § 1352 (actions on bonds executed under
federal law); 28 U.S.C. § 1353 (actions concerning Indian allotments); and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1357 (actions for injuries under federal law). These exceptions have prompted the
Supreme Court to note that the jurisdictional requirement of amount in controversy
is mostly irrelevant in federal question cases, Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405
U.S. 538, 550, n. 18 (1972).
1 But federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction in many instances, e.g., 28 U.S.C.
§ 1333 (1970) (except that under this section the "saving to suitors" clause limits
exclusive federal court jurisdiction over admiralty and maritime matters to limitation
of liability proceedings and in rem maritime actions). See C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF
FEDERAL COURTS 24 (2d ed. 1970).
28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a), 1441 (1970).
, Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), which held, in general, that
federal courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction must apply the substantive law of the
state where the court is located. The Erie doctrine was further refined by several
subsequent cases, most notably Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487
(1941), which held that in diversity cases, the federal district court must follow the
conflict of laws rules of the state in which it sits; Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S.
99 (1945), holding that whether a state law must be applied under Erie depended upon
whether it was "outcome-determinative"; Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc.,
356 U.S. 525 (1958), which indicated that state law need not be applied in diversity
actions if it would disrupt essential characteristics of the federal judicial system; and
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), holding that the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
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follow the choice of law rule of the state in which it is sitting.
Choice of forum clauses have two clearly defined effects;
one affirmative, the other negative.' Affirmatively, it is a con-
sent to the jurisdiction of a particular court with respect to the
issues agreed upon.1 2 In civil law terms, this is known as
prorogation, and is of primary importance to the court which
was selected by the parties to be the exclusive arbiter of any
future disputes arising out of the agreement.'" This affirmative
operation is a bestowal or receipt of a particular jurisdiction by
the parties; that is, a functional consent. On the other hand,
the forum selection provision operates negatively in that it con-
stitutes a denial of exercise of jurisdiction to any court which
is not the chosen forum even though it may otherwise have a
recognized basis for exercising jurisdiction.' 4 This is the
derogation effect in civil law terms, and is of primary import-
ance to the court which could have had jurisdiction, in absence
of the forum stipulation, but was one which the parties chose
not to utilize.' 5 The functional effect of this negative operation
of the choice of forum provision is exclusion, as opposed to the
function of the prorogation aspect, which is consent.'"
The affirmative operation of a choice of forum clause as a
dure are to be applied in diversity actions by federal district courts regardless of state
law.
.. See Reese, The Supreme Court Supports Enforcement of Choice-of-Forum
Clauses, 7 INT'L. LAW. 530, 534 (1973).
12 Id.
11 Perillo, Selected Forum Agreements in Western Europe, 13 Am. J. Comp. L. 162
(1964).
I Reese, supra note 11, at 534.
Perillo, supra note 13, at 162.
" IT]he terms "confer" and "oust" are inappropriate unless they be
clearly understood as shorthand expressions for what really occurs. When
parties agree to "confer" exclusive jurisdiction on the courts of State "A",
they agree merely to surrender their legal privileges to bring an action in any
other state, and at the same time, they have agreed to surrender their privi-
leges to object to the jurisdiction of State "A". If the agreement is enforced,
it cannot truly be said that jurisdiction has been conferred or ousted by the
parties. Jurisdiction is exercised or withheld only by force of the law that
gives effect to the parties' agreement. If this analysis is accepted, it is still
permissible to speak of the "conferring" or "ousting" of jurisdiction by con-
tract so long as we do not allow this terminology to mislead us into thinking
that parties can undermine or augment the powers of states or courts when
they bargain away merely their own legal privileges. Perillo, supra note 13,
at 162.
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prorogation agreement has rarely caused significant problems.
It has been the generally accepted rule for some time that a
court which is otherwise competent'" may exercise personal ju-
risdiction bestowed upon it by the parties' consent before'" or
after'9 the cause of action accrues and render a valid and bind-
ing judgment thereon. That is, consent, even prior to the exist-
ence of the dispute or cause of action, may effectively enable a
court properly to exercise in personam jurisdiction. 20 The
chosen court must take care, however, not to exceed the scope
of jurisdiction to which the party consented and strictly con-
form to the precise specifications of the consent; otherwise, the
judgment is void.'
It is the negative operation of a choice of forum clause in
derogation of the jurisdiction of a court that has led to the most
difficulties. Professor Reese writes that the real question with
regard to a choice of forum provision is whether a court will
enforce the selection in its derogative effect; i.e., whether the
court "will refuse to entertain a suit brought in violation of the
,1 That is, the court has the requisite subject matter jurisdiction to properly deter-
mine the particular cause of action. See R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 48 (1968);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 32, Comment b (1971).
" National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964). "[lit is
settled . . . that parties to a contract may agree in advance to submit to the jurisdic-
tion of a given court, to permit notice to be served by the opposing party, or even to
waive notice altogether." Id. at 315-16. See also EHRENZWEIG at 148; H. GOODRICH &
E. SCOLES, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 73 (1964); R. LEFLAR, supra note 17, at 26; R. WEIN-
TRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 100-02 (1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 32 (1971); Reese, supra note 4, at 194.
", Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59 (1938); see also commentators cited in note 18,
supra.
As a jurisdictional concept, consent to the jurisdiction of a court by a party is
much less objectionable than the "transient rule" of jurisdiction, i.e., exercising in
personam jurisdiction over anyone personally served with process while within the
territory of the forum state, regardless of whether the person is permanently or merely
temporarily there. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 28 (1971); R.
WEINTRAUB, supra note 18, at 96-98. For case examples see Grace v. MacArthur, 170
F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959) (defendant personally served while flying in airplane
over the jurisdiction); Peabody v. Hamilton, 106 Mass. 217 (1870). For a strong criti-
cism and denouncement of the transient jurisdiction rule, see Ehrenzweig, supra note
6.
21 Grover & Baker Sewing Machine Co. v. Radcliffe, 137 U.S. 287 (1890). See R.
LEFLAR, supra note 17, at 48. Furthermore, consent in cognovit, or confession of
judgment clauses are often looked upon with judicial disfavor. See, e.g., Atlas Credit
Corp. v. Ezrine, 25 N.Y.2d 219, 250 N.E.2d 474 (1969), holding that a judgment
obtained on the basis of such a clause is not entitled to full faith and credit.
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clause even though they have personal jurisdiction over the
defendant. 22 That is, the problem is the exclusion rather than
the consent. It is this "derogative" or negative effect with
which this paper will be primarily concerned.
Some choice of forum terms seem, on their face, purely
prorogatory. That is, the clause often simply names a court in
which all disputes are to be brought for determination. The
question then becomes whether the provision means that the
parties intended to exclude all other courts-whether the
choice is exclusive. In general, the court will attempt to inter-
pret the agreement in accordance with the intent of the parties
as in other contract interpretation situations and will draw
inferences of the parties' intent from the surrounding circum-
stances.? So even though the forum selection appears purely
prorogatory, it often still has a derogatory effect. Needless to
say, when drafting a choice of forum provision one should al-
ways clearly indicate the parties' intent that the chosen forum
is to be exclusive.
II. EARLY COMMON LAW DEVELOPMENT
The early common law choice of forum doctrine provided
that every contract was governed by the law of the place of
contracting (lex loci contractus) 4 unless the parties to the con-
tract specifically agreed otherwise.? The parties were permit-
ted, then, to make an effective choice of law through an agree-
ment in their contract; the intention of the parties was upheld
2 Reese, The Contractual Forum: Situation in the United States, 13 AM. J. CoMP.
L. 187 (1964) [hereinafter cited as The Contractual Forum].
" Lenhoff, supra note 6, at 417; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTs § 228(1)
(Tent. Draft 1973).
24 "[TIhe law of the country where a contract is made." A. DicEy & J. Momus,
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 16 (9th ed. 1973).
2 Wuebker v. James, 58 N.Y.S.2d 671, 675, (1944). In Robinson v. Bland, 1 W.B1.
234, 96 Eng. Rep. 129 (1760), where the plaintiff sued in England to enforce a gambling
obligation which arose in France and was valid in France but not in England, Lord
Mansfield stated:
[Tihe general rule established ex comitate et jure gentium is, that the place
where the contract is made and not where the action is brought is to be
considered in expounding and enforcing the contract. But this rule admits
of an exception where the parties (at the time of making the contract) had a
view to a different Kingdom.
1 W. Bl. 234, 259, 96 Eng. Rep. 129, 141 (1760) as cited in Comment, 12 S. Tax. L.J.
214, 215 (1970).
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in this context.26 The common law approach concerning choice
of forum, however, was not so considerate of party intentions.
The general rule was that parties to a contract could not, by
agreement in the contract, "oust" or prevent a court from tak-
ing jurisdiction, and agreements purporting to do so were
void.27 The jurisprudential reasoning behind this rule was that
the jurisdiction of courts was not subject to alteration by pri-
vate agreement. Jurisdiction of courts was said to be subject
only to public and not private control. 21 So at common law, the
parties' intention embodied in a choice of court provision was
ignored, at least in the derogatory sense.
Courts which followed the common law rule denying effect
to choice of forum clauses and refusing to dismiss or stay an
action brought in contravention of such an agreement generally
articulated their decisions on any of three main bases: (1) Par-
ties cannot by private agreement deny the jurisdiction or power
of a court which is otherwise competent, (2) to permit parties
to change the usual plaintiff-oriented forum selecting rules
would be inconvenient and productive of inconsistency, and (3)
forum selection clauses are against public policy. 9 Professor
Reese has pointed out that these explanations actually explain
nothing. The third basis is merely a conclusion without any
rationale behind it; the second arguably concerns only jurisdic-
tional rules and can easily produce rather than lessen consist-
ency; the first is looking at the issue in the wrong terms. Courts
should not look on the choice of forum as an "ouster," but use
their discretion to dismiss, as on forum non conveniens
grounds, when suit is brought in violation of such agreement.0
2, See also A. DICEY & J. MORRIS, supra note 24, at 725; Comment, 12 S. Tx. L.J.
214, 216 nn. 8 & 9 (1970). Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971).
2 Cowen & Da Costa, The Contractual Forum: Situation in England and the
British Commonwealth, 13 AM. J. COMp. L. 179, 181 (1964). See also 6A CoRiIN,
CONTRACTS § 1445 (1962); EHRENZWEIG at 148; Comment, 59 MINN. L. REv. 436-37
(1974). This concept, of course, only applied when the chosen forum was meant to be
exclusive.
11 See generally EHRENZWEIG at 148-49, n. 15 (1962). It is interesting to note that
in 6A CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1445 (1962), the section embodying this concept of "ouster"
of jurisdiction is in a chapter entitled "Bargains Harmful to the Administration of
Justice."
The Contractual Forum supra note 22, at 188.
o Id. See also EHRENZWEIG at 149: "Neither history nor rationale thus bear out the
much-repeated axiom that parties may not 'oust' the courts from their jurisdiction."
[Vol. 65
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The reasons enunciated by the courts do not appear to be
persuasive.3 ' What, then, are the real reasons underlying the
common law rule? Several plausible rationales have been iden-
tified. One such "real" explanation is that courts were often
unwilling to force a local party to litigate in a foreign forum.32
A second reason might be that judicial enmity to forum selec-
tion clauses stems from the courts' early disfavor of arbitration
clauses, applied analogously to choice of forum provisions.3
Another rationale that has been advanced is that the rule may
have begun when judges were paid for the number of cases they
heard and forum selection clauses were a threat to their liveli-
hood.3 4 Finally, and perhaps most realistically, the courts un-
derstood that choice of forum clauses often appear in adhe-
sion-the so-called "take-it-or-leave-it"-contracts, and are
the result of disproportionate bargaining power between the
parties.35 These reasons appear to go more to the overall valid-
ity of the forum selection clause rather than its particular ap-
plication or effect in a particular case. The actual reason be-
hind the decision undoubtedly varies from case to case, and in
some instances is no doubt an amalgam of all the above explan-
ations.3 6
It is important to note here that courts which followed the
common law approach were probably aided by the conceptual
viewpoint they took of the problem; viz., they looked at the
derogatory effect of a choice of forum clause as depriving a
competent court of jurisidiction-usually referred to distaste-
fully, as "ouster." Most recent commentators agree that this is
a misconception of the problem. It has been said that the real
issue is "whether, in a proper case, a court should refrain from
exercising such jurisdiction as it admittedly possesses in order
to give effect to the parties' intentions as expressed in a choice
3' See the analysis in EHRENZWEIG at 148-53.
32 EHRENZWEIG at 150; The Contractual Forum at 188.
3 Nadelman, Choice of Court Clauses in the United States: The Road to Zapata,
21 AM. J. CoMp. L. 124, 127 (1973); The Contractual Forum at 188. But see EHRENzwEG
at 148, where he writes that "[T]here is little historical support for this assumption."
11 The Contractual Forum at 189.
31 Id. at 188; EHRENZWEIG at 150 (citing numerous authorities).
u Professor Ehrenzweig argued that derogative choice of forum agreements were
not upheld in only two situations: to protect a local citizen against a foreign forum,
and in adhesion contracts, EHRENZWEi. at 149, thus denying the other two explanations
discussed in the text.
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of forum clause. ' 37 Clearly, parties cannot deprive a competent
court of jurisdiction simply by an agreement, and this is gener-
ally accepted. 38 However, the proper conception of the deroga-
tory effect of forum selection clauses is not that the court is
deprived of jurisdiction, but that such court will not exercise
the jurisdiction it possesses in order to enforce the agreement
and intent of the parties. 9 It may be noted that this is analo-
gous to a forum non conveniens rationale in that both concern
exercise of the court's discretion0 in determining whether to
decline the exercise of jurisdiction authorized by law in favor
of a foreign forum.4 Indeed it has been suggested that it would
not be inconsistent to force the party attempting to uphold the
choice of forum by asking that the non-selected forum dismiss
31 Reese, supra note 11, at 534. See also Perillo, supra note 13; RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 80, Comment a (1971); A. DiCEY & J. MoRRis, THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS 223 (9th ed. 1973); Farquharson, supra note 4 at 92 (1974); The
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12 (1972); In re Unterweser Reederei,
GMBH, 446 F.2d 907, 908 (en banc) (5th Cir. 1971) (Wisdom, J., dissenting); Win. H.
Muller & Co. v. Swedish American Line Ltd., 224 F.2d 806, 808 (2d Cir. 1955); Central
Contracting Co. v. C.E. Youngdahl & Co., 209 A.2d 810, 816 (Pa. 1965).
38 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 80, Comment a (1971). Cf.
EHRENZWEIG at 151, where he argues that parties are allowed to "legislate," or agree
privately to deprive a competent court of jurisdiction, either when the agreement
postdates the accrual of the cause of action, or when the agreement is between two
aliens. But this appears to be a misconception, because, under jurisdictional concepts,
the non-chosen court would still have the statutory power to ignore the parties' agree-
ment. Cf. the public-private control dichotomy in text accompanying note 28, supra.
"' The Contractual Forum at 189. "What this means in the mechanical sense is
that the court will have jurisdiction to entertain all actions, but has the discretionary
power to stay proceedings brought in breach of a choice of forum agreement." Farquh-
arson, supra note 4, at 92.
"0 Judicial discretion has been defined as "A discretion exercised not arbitrarily
or wilfully, but with regard to what is right and equitable under the circumstances and
the law, and directed by reason and conscience of the judge to a just result." Langnes
v. Green, 282 U.S. 531, 541 (1930).
" The basic case on the law of forum non conveniens is Gulf Oil Co. v. Gilbert,
330 U.S. 501 (1947). See also EHRENZWEIG at 121-27; R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 18, at
154-60; Barrett, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 35 CALIF. L. REv. 380 (1947);
Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American Law, 29 COLUM. L.
REV. 1 (1929); Dainow, The Inappropriate Forum, 29 ILL. L. REv. 867 (1935); Ryan &
Berger, Forum Non Conveniens in California, 1 PAC. L.J. 532 (1970). Compare the
federal transfer statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1970): "For the convenience of parties
and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action
to any other district or division where it might have been brought."
See Currie, Change of Venue and the Conflict of Laws, 22 U. CI. L. REv. 405
(1955). California has codified the concept of forum non conveniens in its long-arm
statute, CAL. CODE Civ. PRo. § 410.30 (1975), and see Ryan and Berger, supra.
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the action to rely on forum non conveniens on the ground that
any forum other than the one selected by the parties is prima
facie inconvenient." However, different factors will be signifi-
cant in the court's decision in choice of forum cases as opposed
to the straight forum non conveniens situation. In the latter
instance, considerations of availability of witnesses, applica-
tion of foreign law, protection of the local plaintiff's choice of
forum, and availability of an alternate forum are likely to be
decisive." Basically, the presumption is against dismissing on
forum non conveniens grounds and in favor of the plaintiff's
chosen forum," especially when the plaintiff is a forum resi-
dent. 5 In the choice of forum context, on the other hand, the
presumption must be that the parties considered these factors
when the agreement was made.46 The significant factors, there-
fore, which determine the reasonableness of the choice of forum
provision itself,47 may not be the same. The presumption
should be reversed in the choice of forum context to favor the
parties' choice absent other indications of unreasonableness. It
is submitted that under this theoretical formulation it is much
more palatable for courts to give effect to the derogatory nature
of choice of forum provisions, and this has undoubtedly been
significant in the modification of the common law rule, as dis-
cussed below.
Ill. HiSTORICAL SKETCH OF THE AMERIcAN VIEW PRIOR TO 1972
The following is intended as background in order to give
some historical perspective to the problem of choice of forum
provisions. This somewhat cursory examination of the trend of
American thought concerning choice of forum clauses is neces-
sarily brief both because of space limitations and because some
42 Casenote, 11 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L LAw 449, 451-52 (1972). See also The Con-
tractual Forum at 198; Hay, International Versus Interstate Conflicts Law in the
United States, 35 RABmis ZEITSCHrmwr 429, 442 (1971).
,1 See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947); Ryan & Berger, Forum Non
Conveniens in California, 1 PAC. L.J. 532 (1970).
" "[Ulnless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff's
choice of forum should rarely be disturbed." Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501,
508 (1947).
4s See Ryan & Berger, supra note 43 at 545-49, and cases cited therein.
See Comment, 6 N.Y.U. J. INT'L. L. & POL. 369, 380 (1973).
4, See Section VII, infra.
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very good work has been done in this area to which the inter-
ested researcher may refer.18
The traditional view of the American courts was the com-
mon law approach; 9 the court would refuse to give effect to an
agreement in derogation of the exercise of its jurisdiction. In
other words, the courts "did not let the fact that they were not
the chosen forum deter them from hearing the case."5 An early
decision consonant with this view was the Massachusetts case
of Nute v. Hamilton Mutual Insurance Co.,5' in which a choice
of forum clause concerned venue in the domestic courts of a
single state. Nevertheless, the court refused to give effect to the
parties' choice to deny it the ability to determine the case when
it was otherwise competent.2 The reasons articulated for the
decision were those generally given, that parties cannot by
agreement alter legal rules regarding jurisdiction and venue
since only the state has such power, and that public policy
militates against allowing parties to change forum by agree-
ment because of the potential for extra-legal motivation for
such desires. 5 3 For the most part the traditional common law
view prevailed through the mid-19th century in the United
States.54
The application of the common law rule was not, however,
absolute, and courts would give effect to a choice of forum
clause in exceptional circumstances. For example, in Mitten-
thal v. Mascagni,55 the Massachusetts court refused to enter-
tain an action in violation of a choice of forum agreement to
determine all disputes in the courts of Florence, Italy. The
special circumstances making such a provision "reasonable"
were that both parties were foreigners5" and that Mascagni was
"8 For example, EHRENZWEIG at 147-53; A. EHRENZWEIG & E. JAYME, 2 PRIVATE
INT'L. LAW § 181 (1973); R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 18, at 163-65; Lenhoff at 430-39;
Nadelman, supra note 33; Reese, supra note 11; The Contractual Forum, supra note
22. See also Annot., 56 A.L.R.2d 300 (1957).
" Reese, supra note 11, at 534 [citing EHRENZWEIG at 148-53; The Contractual
Forum at 1871.
Id.
72 Mass. 174 (1856).
52 Id. at 184.
I' d.
See Annot., 56 A.L.R. 300, 306-20 (1957).
66 N.E. 425 (Mass. 1903).
" The defendant was an Italian resident and citizen; the plaintiff was a New York
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to travel through Europe and perform at numerous places in
the United States and Canada under the contract so that the
parties needed the certainty of a single forum. 57
Another exception was often allowed when the choice of
forum agreement was entered into after the cause of action
arose. For instance, in Gitler v. Russian Co.,58 a New York court
upheld an agreement in which the plaintiff promised not to
pursue a remedy in enforcement of a judgment except in the
courts of Russia where such agreement was obtained for valua-
ble consideration. The court distinguished this case from the
general rule that parties could not "withdraw from the jurisdic-
tion of the courts all future controversies that might arise re-
specting the relative rights of the contracting parties"59 by es-
tablishing that parties could agree "not to submit to the courts
a particular pending controversy."6 That is to say that choice
of forum clauses concerning litigation in futuro were not al-
lowed, but such provisions concerning causes of action existing
at the time the agreement was entered into would be upheld.',
This may be functionally compared to a partial settlement
agreement between the parties.
The erosion of the common law rule became apparent
when Judge Learned Hand, in 1949 noted in dictum that "[i]n
truth, I do not believe that, today at least, there is an absolute
taboo against such contracts at all; in the words of the
resident, but be had in the contract elected domicile in Italy, and the court treated
bbth as Italian citizens. 66 N.E. 425, 426.
11 66 N.E. at 426-27.
108 N.Y.S. 793 (Sup. Ct. 1903).
5, Id. at 794, citing Insurance Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. 445 (1874).
108 N.Y.S. at 794.
" See also Akerly v. N.Y. Cent. R.R., 73 F. Supp. 903 (N.D. Ohio 1947); Clark v.
Lowden, 48 F. Supp. 261 (D. Minn. 1942), appeal dismissed per stipulation 135 F. 2d
740 (8th Cir. 1943); Detwiler v. Lowden, 269 N.W. 367 (Minn. 1936); all upholding a
voluntary forum limitation agreement entered into for valuable consideration after the
cause of action arose under the Federal Employer's Liability Act (F.E.L.A.) [45 U.S.C.
§§51-60 (1970)1, on the ground that it was permissible to make such a choice of forum
and thus did not contravene the F.E.L.A. section providing that the cause may be
brought in any federal district court or state court which would otherwise have jurisdic-
tion [45 U.S.C. §56 (1970)]. The express holding of these cases has been overruled by
Boyd v. Grand Trunk West. R.R., 338 U.S. 263 (1949), holding that 45 U.S.C. § 56
(1970), giving the plaintiff a statutory choice of forum is superior, and an agreement
contrary to such statutory provision is inoperative. The application of the general
exception is, however, undisturbed in nonstatutory cases.
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Restatement [of Contracts § 558 (1932)], they are invalid only
when unreasonable . . . .,,12 This statement marks the ad-
vancement of the "reasonableness" rule in evaluating the effect
choice of forum agreements will be given. A 1951 Second Cir-
cuit case expressly illustrates application of the rule that choice
of forum provisions will be upheld unless they are unreasona-
ble, a tacit abandonment of the stricter common law approach.
In Cerro de Pasco Copper Corp. v. Knut Knutsen, 13 goods were
to be shipped from Peru to Norway with a bill of lading, drawn
at the point of shipment (Peru), which conferred exclusive ju-
risdiction on Norwegian courts. The court determined that the
agreement was not unreasonable and upheld the choice of
court. 4 This case can be analogized to a forum non conveniens
decision since there were no contacts with the United States
except that it was the jurisdiction in which the defendant was
found, and that such a forum was inconvenient in the face of
an express choice.
The somewhat parallel development of the law concerning
arbitration agreements should be noted here.65 A court asked
to stay its proceedings pending arbitration pursuant to an
agreement by the parties is faced with the same conceptual
question as is a court which is asked to dismiss because of a
choice of forum stipulation. In each case the court is being
"2 Krenger v. Pennsylvania R.R., 174 F.2d 556, 561 (2d Cir. 1949). But cf. Berg-
man, Contractual Restrictions on the Forum, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 438, 440-45 (1960).
"[It is very clear that if we look to the authorities he [Hand] cites for the broad
proposition that these clauses are 'invalid only when unreasonable,' we must reach the
conclusion that the authorities are more properly cited for the rule that these clauses
are always unreasonable except where the doctrine of forum non conveniens may
properly be applied." Id. at 443. Even assuming arguendo that this was true in 1960,
it is clearly not so today since Zapata unequivocally states that choice of forum clauses
are "prima facie valid and should be enforced unless enforcement is shown by the
resisting party to be 'unreasonable' under the circumstances." The Bremen v. Zapata
Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 10 (1972).
:3 187 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1951).
Id. at 991.
See generally A. DicEY & J. MORRIS, supra note 24, at 1091-96; EHRENZWEir at
153-57; R. LEFLAR, supra note 17, at § 152; W. STURGES, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATIONS AND
AWARDS § 15 (1930); Lorenzen, Commercial Arbitration-International and Interstate
Aspects, 43 YALE L.J. 716 (1934); Stern, The Conflict of Laws in Commercial
Arbitration, 17 LAW & CONTEM. PROB. 567 (1952). Our only concern here is with the
effect of the arbitration agreement on the court's exercise of jurisdiction, and not with
other aspects of arbitration law such as the enforcement of arbitral awards or the law
to be applied by the arbiters.
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asked, in effect, to decline to exercise jurisdiction it is given by
law in order to uphold a private agreement between the parties.
Originally, most courts refused to stay actions pending arbitra-
tion because of the "revocability" of such agreements." Ulti-
mately, the rationale became the familiar one that parties
could not, by private agreement, "oust" a court, otherwise
competent, of jurisdiction."7 Eventually, however, legislative
enactments"8 evidenced a positive attitude toward arbitration
agreements. Many now provide expressly for staying judicial
action pending arbitration,69 and such an attitude concerning
stays is "well on the way to general acceptance. ' ''
The reasonableness test was given a tremendous boost in
the 1955 Second Circuit case of Win. H. Muller & Co. v.
Swedish American Line Ltd.7 1 In Muller, the plaintiff was a
New York corporation and was consignee for goods to be
shipped from Gothenburg to Philadelphia on defendant's ship
"Oklahoma." There was a choice of forum clause in the bill of
lading which conferred jurisdiction exclusively on Swedish
" Lorenzen, Commercial Arbitration-International and Interstate Aspects, 43
YALE L.J. 716 (1934), citing the classic Vynior's Case, 8 Co. 80a & 81b, 77 Eng. Rep.
597 (D.B. 1609). "Revocability" has been defined to mean either that actions may be
maintained by either party to an arbitration provision in contravention of the
agreement or that either party may end the agreement and any powers given to the
arbiters by giving adequate notice. W. STURGES, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATIONS AND
AWARDS, 45 (1930).
"7 W. STURGES, supra note 65, at 45, citing Kill v. Hollister, 1 Wils. 129 (K.B.
1746); Lorenzen, supra note 65, at 717; Stern, supra note 65, at 572. See United States
Asphalt Ref. Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 222 F. 1006 (S.D.N.Y. 1915); Annot.,
56 A.L.R. 2d 300 (1957).
,1 E.g., Federal Arbitration Act of 1925, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1970) (applying only to
interstate and foreign commerce, or maritime agreements); New York Arbitration Act
of 1920, N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW §§ 7501-14 (McKinney 1963); English Arbitration Act of
1950, § 4.
" E.g., 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1970):
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States
upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for
such arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied
that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration
under such an agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay the
trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the
terms of the agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not in default
in proceeding with such arbitration.
71 EHRENZWEIG at 156. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, (1974),
discussed at note 229 and accompanying text, infra. In Scherk, the court seemed to
place arbitration clauses in a subcategory of choice of forum provisions.
71 224 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1955).
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courts for determination of disputes under the contract. The
ship was lost at sea, and the plaintiff sued in federal court
contending that the choice of forum provision was invalid be-
cause contrary to the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act,7 a section
of which provides that clauses which relieve carrier from liabil-
ity or lessen such liability are void. 73 The court determined that
this choice of forum clause did not lessen the carrier's liabil-
ity.74 The court then went on to apply the reasonableness test
to the choice of forum provision.
[T]he parties by agreement cannot oust a court of jurisdic-
tion otherwise obtaining; notwithstanding the agreement the
court has jurisdiction. But if in the proper exercise of its
jurisdiction, by a preliminary ruling the court finds that the
agreement is not unreasonable in the setting of the particular
case, it may properly decline jurisdiction and relegate a liti-
gant to the forum to which he assented.75
The Muller Court listed five factors to be considered in
determining the reasonableness of the forum limitation provi-
sion in this case: (1) Ownership of the ship and place of con-
struction (when the ship was lost at sea); (2) the nationality
and residence of the crew members; (3) whether the chosen
court will apply the same measure of damages as the instant
forum; (4) whether the chosen forum's limitation proceedings
are more restrictive; and (5) the potential for fair and just
adjudication of the case in the chosen forum.7 1
Unfortunately, the effectiveness of Muller's explanation
was tarnished somewhat when it was overruled in Indussa
Corp. v. S.S. Ranborg.77 Indussa held that a choice of forum
clause such as in Muller did in fact operate to lessen the liabil-
ity of the carrier in contravention of the Carriage of Goods by
12 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-15 (1970).
" 46 U.S.C. § 1303(8) (1970).
" 224 F.2d at 807.
,1 Id. at 808.
" Id. Federal cases following the Muller rationale and applying the reasonableness
test include Takemura & Co. v. The S.S. Tsuneshima Maru, 197 F. Supp. 909
(S.D.N.Y. 1961); Skins Trading Corp. v. The S.S. Punta del Este, 180 F. Supp. 609
(S.D.N.Y. 1960); Chemical Carriers v. L. Smit & Co.'s Internationale S., 154 F. Supp.
886 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Murillo, Ltd. v. The Bio Bio, The Paraguay, The Argentina, 127
F. Supp. 13 (2d Cir. 1955). See also EHRENZWE.G at 152, nn. 31 & 32, and cases cited.
7' 377 F. 2d 200 (2d Cir. 1967).
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Sea Act 78 and was thus ineffective and void.79 Therefore, al-
though Indussa did not affect Muller's application of the rea-
sonableness test, the fact that Muller had been overruled "left
its authority impaired on all counts."8
The continuing vitality of the traditional approach was
evidenced in the 1958 Fifth Circuit case of Carbon Black Ex-
port v. The S.S. Monrosa.8' In this case the bills of lading
provided for exclusive jurisdiction in the courts of Italy for any
actions for damages due to nondelivery of goods brought by the
American consignee against the shipowner or its agents. The
Carbon Black court held that the choice of forum clause would
not be enforced to deprive it of the right to hear the case, citing
the traditional rule that "agreements in advance of controversy
whose object is to oust the jurisdiction of the courts are con-
trary to public policy and will not be enforced. 82 The court
attempted to distinguish Muller on the grounds that in the
latter case the ship had been lost at sea, it was not an in rem
action, and that the choice of forum clause therein was
broader 83- basically that in the case of an in rem proceeding
under these facts, the United States was as convenient as the
chosen forum. Carbon Black, then, seems to apply the basic
common law view with the modification that the suit will not
be entertained if the chosen court is the more convenient
forum."
In 1965, an important state case applying the reasonable-
ness test was decided. In Central Contracting Co. v. C.E.
Youngdahl & Co.," a construction subcontract, to be per-
formed in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, contained an exclusive
46 U.S.C. § 1303(8) (1970).
377 F.2d at 204.
' Reese, supra note 11, at 536.
' 254 F. 2d 297 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. granted 358 U.S. 809 (1958), petition for cert.
dismissed 359 U.S. 180 (1959). See also the discussion in text accompanying notes 26-
35, supra.
11 Id. at 300-01.
Id. at 300.
" Carbon Black has been heavily criticized by commentators even though it prob-
ably represented the majority view when decided. See, e.g., Lenhoff, supra note 6;
Maw, Conflict Avoidance in International Contracts, in INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS:
CHOICE OF LAW & LANGUAGE 23 (W. Reese ed. 1962); Reese, supra note 4; The Contrac-
tual Forum, supra note 22.
" 209 A.2d 810 (Pa. 1965).
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choice of forum provision selecting New York County, New
York, courts. The Youngdahl court applied the reasonableness
test and gave effect to the express choice of forum. Concerning
the consideration of reasonableness, the court stated that:
Such an agreement is unreasonable only where its enforce-
ment would, under all the circumstances existing at the time
of litigation, seriously impair plaintiff's ability to pursue his
cause of action. Mere inconvenience or additional expense is
not the test of unreasonableness since it may be assumed that
the plaintiff received under the contract consideration for
these things. If the agreed upon forum is available to plaintiff
and said forum can do substantial justice to the cause of
action then the plaintiff should be bound by his agreement.
Moreover, the party seeking to obviate the agreement has the
burden of proving its unreasonableness. 6
This analysis of the application of the reasonableness rule is
most significant, and will be discussed more fully below.
In Central Contracting Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co.,87
the plaintiff performed a contract for the city of Pittsburgh and
subsequently sued the city's surety in federal court for the bal-
ance due on the contract and for extra work claims. The surety
contract contained a clause providing that any dispute under
the contract was to be brought only in the courts of New York
County, New York and also had a choice of law provision desig-
nating application of New York law. The Third Circuit applied
the reasonableness test, citing Youngdahl and applying Penn-
sylvania law,8" and upheld the effectiveness of the choice of
forum clause upon a finding of no unreasonableness." The
court indicated that it considered two elements most signifi-
cant in determining the reasonableness of the selected forum,
distance from plaintiff's home office, and the complementary
choice of law provision."0 Oregon recently became an adherent
to the reasonableness test when it overruled its previous cases
"' Id. at 816.
367 F.2d 341 (3d Cir. 1966).
Although the court expressly stated that it was not deciding whether it was
bound to apply the Pennsylvania position in a diversity case, i.e. Erie R.R. Co. v.
Tomkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) and note 10, supra, it did so nevertheless on the basis that
it was increasingly becoming the preferred rule. 367 F.2d at 345-46.
Id. at 344-45.
" Id.
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following the common law approach in Reeves v. The Chem
Industrial Co.' and upheld a choice of forum clause where it
was found to be reasonable and, further, was not contained in
a contract of adhesion.2
Almost all claims of right under choice of forum provisions
involve a defensive posture; the defendant is normally at-
tempting to persuade the court to dismiss or stay the action
pending a determination by the chosen forum. However, con-
ceivably a suit brought in violation of a choice of forum agree-
ment would bring about a cause of action for damages for
breach of contract although there is little case authority for this
proposition. 3 It would perhaps be a good idea to include a
liquidated damages provision in the contract relating to actions
brought in violation of a choice of forum clause since actual
damages from such breach might be somewhat difficult to as-
certain. 4 A defendant might also attempt to enjoin proceedings
brought in contravention of a choice of forum provision. 5 And
in Furbee v. Vantage Press, Inc.,"5 the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals awarded attorney's fees to the defendant
where the plaintiff appealed the dismissal of an action brought
in contravention to a forum selection agreement, ruling that
the appeal was "without merit and frivolous," since the case
law was clear and the plaintiff was aware of defendant's au-
thorities. 7
" 495 P.2d 729 (Ore. 1972).
,2 Id. at 732. For a more complete listing of cases applying the reasonableness test
to choice of forum clauses see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS 80
(Reporter's note) (1971).
Is See The Contractual Forum at 187; and Nute v. Hamilton Mut. Ins. Co., 72
Mass. 174 (1856), which intimated in dictum that an action for damages would lie. No
other case has been found which considers the possibility of damages.
" For the validity of liquidated damages clauses, see generally J. CALAMARI & J.
PERILLO, CONTRACTS 366-70 (1970); C. MCCORMICK, DAMAGES §§ 146-57 (1935). UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-718(1) provides that:
[d]amages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agreement
but only at an amount which is reasonable in the light of the anticipated or
actual harm caused by the breach, the difficulties of proof of loss, and the
inconvenience or nonfeasibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy.
A term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is void as a penalty.
' See generally EIIRENZWEIG at 183-84.
" 464 F.2d 835 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
" Id. at 837.
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IV. THE VIEWS OF OTHER LEGAL SYSTEMS
A short diversion from the study of the American attitude
toward choice of forum agreements will be made in order to
consider the attitude of other nations toward such provisions.
Again the primary concern will be with the derogatory effect
of these provisions. The approaches taken toward the problem
by other nations are relevant in that in an international con-
tract one party may expect a choice of forum to be enforced or
not as a matter of course.9"
The general rule in England and the Commonwealth is
that choice of forum provisions are prima facie valid if the
chosen court is of "competent jurisdiction.""9 Older cases anal-
ogized forum selection clauses to agreements to arbitrate and
thus governed by various arbitration statutes."" However, re-
cent decisions have upheld such clauses on more straightfor-
ward grounds such as the theory. that since one policy of con-
tract law is to compel compliance with agreements, courts
should not entertain an action brought in direct violation of
such an agreement."0 ' In certain situations a particular statute
may govern and invalidate an otherwise effective choice of
forum.102 In the usual situation, although the choice of forum
is prima facie valid, the decision whether to give effect to the
choice of forum is within the discretion of the court, and the
court will "weigh the competing interests of the parties.' '0 3
11 This brief analysis is basically for comparative purposes and is an amalgam
synthesized from several law review articles which are indicated in the notes following.
11 Cowen & Da Costa, The Contractual Forum: Situation in England and the
British Commonwealth, 13 AM. J. CoMP. L. 179, 180 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Cowen
& Da Costal. Decisions upholding forum selection clauses date back to 1796, Gienar
v. Meyer, 2 H. Bl. 126 Eng. Rep. 728 (C.P. 1796).
"I Cowen & Da Costa at 182, citing Law v. Garrett, 8 Ch. D. 26 (1878) as the
case originating this reasoning. For other cases see Cowen & Da Costa at 182, nn. 25-
28.
to[ Cowen & Da Costa at 182-83, citing Racecourse Betting Control Board v.
Secretary for Air, [19441 1 Ch. 114, 126 (C.A.).
I Cowen & Da Costa at 183 give as an example § 9(2) of the Australian Sea
Carriage of Goods Act of 1924 providing that no agreement may in any way limit the
exercise of jurisdiction by Australian courts respecting a bill of lading covering goods
imported into Australia. Cf. Indussa Corp. v. S.S. Ranborg, 377 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1967),
discussed in text accompanying notes 77-80, supra.
"I Cowen & Da Costa at 184, citing The Fehmarn, [1938] 1 Weekly L.R. 159
(C.A.), where the court permitted an action in contravention of a forum selection
provision upon a showing by the plaintiff that to dismiss and uphold the agreement
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This may be analogized to a reasonableness test.
Other western European countries, however, are less
friendly to choice of forum clauses which purport to exclude
national courts from exercising jurisdiction.0 Spain flatly de-
nies any derogatory effect to choice of forum agreements,, ' and
Portugal only gives effect to them when they are contained in
"contracts between aliens that are to be performed abroad and
involve no property in Portugal."' "6 The Italian view is that
forum selection clauses in derogation of Italian court jurisdic-
tion are generally ineffective and effect will be given to them
only in cases with pecuniary subject matter between aliens or
between an alien and a nonresident nondomiciliary citizen. 0 7
The Spanish, Portuguese, and Italian rules evidence a strong
policy toward protecting local citizens by the guarantee of a
local forum irrespective of contractual provision to the con-
trary. The attitude of the Netherlands seems relatively rational
and is strikingly similar to the English explanation:10 although
the parties cannot change the rules of jurisdiction on their own,
the courts will not entertain an action in contravention of the
parties' choice of forum agreement so as not to take part in a
breach of contract.' 9 A choice of court provision in derogation
of a national court will effectively proscribe litigating the issue
in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, and Switzer-
land except where the subject matter of the action concerns
immovables within the state or where matters of public policy
are involved.110 Most western European countries require that
choice of forum agreements be in writing. If they are contained
in an adhesion contract,"' they will only be enforced if sepa-
rately signed by the party sought to be charged and if they
might operate to deny him any remedy at all, and that England was in fact a more
convenient forum. For further discussion of the English rule see A. DIcay & J. MORRIS,
supra note 24, at 222-24, and cases cited therein.
"I Perillo, Selected Forum Agreements in Western Europe, 13 AM. J. COMP. L.
162, 164 (1964).
'0 Id.
'"Id.
'" Id. at 165, citing C. PRO. Civ., art. 2 (1942).
,85 See note 101, supra. See also text accompanying note 29, supra.
," Perillo, supra note 104 at 165.
, Id. at 165; Lenhoff, supra note 6, at 419-23.
' See note 200, infra.
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involve a pecuniary dispute."' However, the bare fact that
there is an adhesion contract will not render the contract inef-
fective. Also a choice of forum clause will ordinarily be allowed
to operate in a prorogation sense and confer jurisdiction on a
court on a consent rationale if the court is otherwise competent,
especially regarding pecuniary matters.13
There are few existing Scandinavian decisions on the effec-
tiveness of forum selection clauses because "parties take the
validity of forum selection clauses for granted and . . . the
lower courts, for their part, share this view.""' 4 It is necessary,
then, to turn to the legal writings of scholars to evaluate the
Scandinavian position. The prevalent view among Scandina-
vian legal writers is that "a valid forum selection clause ex-
cludes the forum which would, but for the stipulation, be a
proper forum.""11 5 Thus actions brought in contravention of a
choice of forum agreement will not usually be entertained.
Forum selection provisions have to be written to be valid in
Sweden, but not in Denmark and Norway."' Furthermore, the
clause must expressly indicate the intent to choose a particular
forum and specifically name the chosen jurisdiction but not a
particular court therein." 7 Some matters, such as family law,
patents, and trademarks, are thought to be peculiarly within
the jurisdiction of the forum court so that choice of forum
clauses concerning these subjects are ineffective."' Concerning
the prorogatory operation of forum selection clauses, there
must generally be some relationship between the chosen forum
and the transaction in question without which the court may
refuse to hear the cause."9
The positions of the Latin American countries evidence
the same divergence of opinion that is apparent among Euro-
pean nations although the rules are less certain and seem to be
in a state of flux. Guatemala, by statute, always allows an
21 Perillo, supra note 104, at 165.
Id. at 164. See text accompanying notes 11-20, supra, for discussion of proroga-
tory aspect.
"' Eek, The Contractual Forum: Scandinavia, 13 Am. J. COMP. L. 173, 174 (1964).
Id.
Id. at 175.
27 Id. at 176.
,, Id. at 176-77.
'" Id. at 178.
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action against a defendant at his domicile'2 so that exclusive
jurisdiction clauses are rendered significantly less effective.
Panama, on the other hand, permits derogation clauses to
function effectively by statute.' Mexico and Cuba normally
recognize choice of law agreements and allow them to have
derogatory effect,122 but the use of these domestic rules in the
context of choice of forum clauses in international contracts is
"questionable." 1 Brazil was formerly thought to be a jurisdic-
tion which would give effect to a choice of forum provision in
an international contract and refuse to hear an action in con-
travention of the agreement,'24 but apparently there is now
some doubt as to Brazil's position.25 A 1961 case indicates that
now Brazil generally favors choice of forum clauses but tempers
this inclination with considerations of fairness.2 ' There are cer-
tain matters which must be brought in Brazilian courts, such
as cases concerning Brazilian real property and labor disputes,
so that derogatory choice of court provisions in these areas will
not be enforced.'27 Originally Argentina also refused to enter-
tain a cause of action in violation of a choice of forum clause 28
and allowed complete party autonomy. However, this rule was
changed in 1936 by a case which held that an international
contract with a choice of forum clause would not preclude Ar-
gentinian courts from hearing the matter on the basis of a
constitutional provision giving federal courts sole jurisdiction
120 Schwind, Derogation Clauses in Latin-American Law, 13 Am. J. COMP. L. 167-
68 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Schwind].
"I' Id. at 168, citing PANAMANIAN JUDICIARY CODE art. 237.
122 They recognize and apply the chosen law rather than the law of the forum.
" Schwind at 168.
,21 Id. at 168-69, citing Martinelli, S.A. v. Columbia, Cia. National de Seguros,
Appeal No. 1,622 of August 31, 1954, 115 A.J. 319 (1955), where the court would not
entertain a cause of action brought in violation of a choice of forum clause even though
the defendant was a Brazilian domiciliary and delivery was to be effected there.
125 Schwind at 169, and especially cases cited therein.
"I Id. at 169-70, citing Castagna v. Rubel, case no. 7,909 of May 30, 1961, 203 Rev.
For. 197 (1962). However, the author notes the uncertainty of the area by pointing out
that this ruling may be reversed on the theory that jurisdiction concerns public policy
and is not subject to waiver, thus meaning that no derogation clauses would be en-
forced. Schwind at 170. The Brazilian position seems roughly similar to the present
American test. See Section V infra.
"I Schwind at 170.
121 Id., citing Montepagano v. Eriksen, May 21, 1923, 138 Fallos 62, 10 J.A. 445
(1923).
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over admiralty concerns. 129 The trend, then, in Latin American
countries is not particularly favorable to upholding choice of
forum clauses in international contracts. 30
V. THE SUPREME COURT ADOPTS THE REASONABLENESS TEST
By 1972, the reasonableness test in choice of forum stipula-
tions, that the court would give effect to the parties' choice of
forum and dismiss an action brought in contravention of such
provision unless the party resisting application of the choice
could show it was unreasonable, was a strong and increasingly
popular minority position in the United States. It needed only
a slight boost to make it clearly the favored rule one could
confidently predict would be applied by the greater number of
courts passing on this question in the future. That boost came
when the United States Supreme Court adopted the reason-
ableness test in deciding whether to give effect to a choice
of forum provision in The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore
Company. 31
The somewhat complicated, but nevertheless important,
sequence of events leading to the Supreme Court decision in
Zapata was as follows. The Zapata Off-Shore Company, an
American corporation, solicited bids for towing the drilling rig
"Chaparral" from Louisiana to the Adriatic Sea off Ravenna,
Italy. A German corporation, Unterweser Reederei, was low
bidder and submitted a draft contract to Zapata, which pro-
vided that all disputes under the contract would be brought
before the Court of Justice in London, England, and also in-
cluded a clause disclaiming any liability on the part of Unter-
weser "for defaults and/or errors in the navigation of the
tow."'' 32 Zapata made a few suggestions for changes in the con-
tract to which Unterweser agreed, but said nothing about the
choice of forum and exculpatory provisions. After the tow got
under way, the drilling rig was badly damaged by a storm in
"' Schwind at 171, citing Compte y Cia. v. Ybarra y Cia., Nov. 16, 1936, 56 J.A.
355 (1936).
11 Schwind at 173. He also notes that choice of forum provisions are generally
allowed to have prorogative effect even if both parties are aliens, and especially if the
subject matter has some relation to the forum. Id. at 167.
" 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
,32 Id. at 3, n. 2.
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the Gulf of Mexico in international waters. Zapata instructed
that the rig be taken to Tampa, Florida, the nearest safe haven,
and subsequently sued Unterweser there in federal district
court in contravention of the choice of forum provision in the
contract, on the bases of negligence in towing the rig and
breach of contract, asking for $3,500,000 damages.
In the district court action, Unterweser moved to dismiss
on grounds of the choice of forum clause in the contract and
forum non conveniens and alternatively asked the court to stay
the action until the dispute could be brought before the London
Court of Justice. Unterweser then sued Zapata in the London
court for breach of contract before the district court ruled on
its motion. In the British action Zapata contested the jurisdic-
tion of the London court but lost on this contention when the
court ruled that the choice of forum clause was effective con-
sent to its jurisdiction. This was affirmed on appeal. '33 Unter-
weser also filed a limitation action in the Florida federal dis-
trict court just prior to the expiration of the 6 month period,
and the court enjoined the parties from seeking additional rem-
edies in other courts as is customary. Subsequently the district
court refused to give effect to the choice of forum agreement on
the traditional ground that agreements between parties to a
contract attempting to confer exclusive jurisdiction on one
court are invalid and unenforceable on public policy grounds.
The court also denied Unterweser's forum non conveniens mo-
tion and granted Zapata's motion to enjoin Unterweser from
proceeding in the London action."' A Fifth Circuit panel af-
firmed the district court,' and the decision was later adopted
on a hearing en banc although 6 of the 14 judges dissented.'36
The majority applied the Carbon Black approach that choice
of forum agreements prior to the inception of a cause of action
are unenforceable as contrary to public policy and also indi-
cated that litigation in a British court might materially affect
Zapata's substantive rights because the disclaimer of liability
provision would be unenforceable under United States federal
" Id. at 4, n. 4; Unterweser Reederei GMBH v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., [1968] 2
LI. List L. Rep. 158.
" In re Unterweser Reederei, GMBH, 296 F. Supp. 733 (M.D. Fla. 1969).
'' 428 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970).
131 446 F.2d 907 (5th Cir. 1971).
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law on public policy grounds although it apparently would be
valid in England.'37 In dealing with the forum non conveniens
argument, the majority suggested that trial in Florida would be
at least as convenient to witnesses as trial in Great Britain
since its only connection with the action was its having been
selected as the forum by the parties. Judge Wisdom presented
an excellent analysis of the problem in well-reasoned dissents
in the panel decision 38 and upon the rehearing' 39 in which he
favored applying the reasonableness test, thereby relegating
the parties to the chosen forum consistent with their agreement
as well as overruling Carbon Black.'40
The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit ruling in an
8-1 decision with Chief Justice Burger writing the majority
opinion and Justice Douglas dissenting. The Court adopted the
reasonableness approach in considering whether to give effect
to the choice of forum clause, holding that such clauses are
"prima facie valid and should be enforced unless enforcement
is shown by the resisting party to be "unreasonable" under the
circumstances."'' Burger noted that a narrow view of choice of
forum provisions would harm the expansion of American busi-
ness activities in international markets, and speaking with evi-
dent disapproval of the traditional view espoused in Carbon
Black noted that "the absolute aspects of the Carbon Black
case have little place and would be a heavy hand indeed on the
future development of international commercial dealings by
Americans.'1 2 The adopted rule is, the Court said, consonant
with the "ancient concepts of freedom of contract" and serves
' 407 U.S. at 8, n. 8; 428 F.2d at 895. It is perhaps questionable that the English
court would apply English law absent a choice of law provision as well as the absence
of any contacts whatsoever with England aside from being the chosen forum. At any
rate it seems alien to the American rule and would be based on the idea that choice of
forum also implies choice of law: qui elegitiudicem elegitjus. But there are indications
that the English courts do assume that choice of forum implies choice of law. See
Cowen & Da Costa, supra note 99, at 181, n. 235.
1- 428 F.2d 888, 896 (5th Cir. 1970) (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
13 446 F.2d 907, 908 (5th Cir. 1971) (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
" 428 F.2d at 898, 911. The statement concerning the sequence of events was from
407 U.S. at 1-8.
"1 407 U.S. at 10, citing, inter alia Central Contracting Corp. v. Maryland Cas-
ualty Co., 367 F.2d 341 (3d Cir. 1966); Win. H. Muller & Co. v. Swedish American
Line Ltd., 224 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1955); Central Contracting Co. v. C.E. Youngdahl &
Co., 209 A.2d 810 (Pa. 1965).
"1 407 U.S. at 8-9.
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to promote this policy to a significant extent.13 The Court
viewed the choice of forum as material because of the need to
eliminate uncertainties as to the place of suit by selecting a
forum in advance and because such agreements constitute an
"indispensable element in international trade, commerce, and
contracting."'' Chief Justice Burger understood that the real
issue in the case was not "ouster" of jurisdiction but whether
a court should give effect to the freely negotiated choice of the
parties and uphold their expectations, 1 5 thus avoiding the doc-
trinal misconception that has plagued many previous courts
upholding the traditional rule.'
In considering the issue of the reasonableness of the forum
selection agreement, the Court emphasized several factors.
First, it was noted that the chosen forum was completely neu-
tral as between two parties of diverse nationality.'47 Second, the
contract was freely negotiated between "experienced and so-
phisticated businessmen;"'4 it was not an instance of the use
of "overweening bargaining power"'' and was thus not a con-
tract of adhesion-Zapata had other alternatives. Third, there
was no evidence of undue influence or fraud.50 Burger disposed
of Zapata's contention that the forum clause was unenforceable
because the English view validating "the disclaimer would vio-
late a strong public policy of the forum, another element in the
reasonableness determination, by distinguishing the federal
rule that such exculpatory clauses were unenforceable.'5 ' The
federal rule relates only to towage within American waters. The
policy bases for the rule-discouragement of negligence and
fear that inequality of bargaining power produced the stipula-
tion-were not involved here since the negligence, if any, oc-
curred in international waters and since the contract was freely
" Id. at 11. See generally, Yntema, "Autonomy" in Choice of Law, 1 AM. J. COMP.
L. 341 (1952); Note, Conflict of Laws: "Party Autonomy" in Contracts, 57 COLUM. L.
REv. 553 (1957).
"1 407 U.S. at 13-14.
"5 Id. at 12.
" See text accompanying note 37, supra.
407 U.S. at 12.
i' Id.
i" Id.
'S' Id.
"' See Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp., 349 U.S. 85 (1955).
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bargained for and entered into.'2 One may fairly assume that
the contract price considered the exculpatory provision-the
parties got what they bargained for, and absent adhesion,
fraud, duress, public policy, and any other reasonableness con-
sideration, the parties' choice should not be disturbed.
The inconvenience of the chosen forum to a party to a
contract is another element of reasonableness. The Court held
that to render a choice of forum provision ineffective on this
basis, the forum selected must be "seriously inconvenient for
the trial of the action. '1 53 Serious inconvenience was defined to
mean that one party would be "effectively deprived of a mean-
ingful day in court."'54 The case was remanded to allow Zapata
an opportunity to prove that the London court was seriously
inconvenient although the Court noted that this would be a
"heavy burden" since the neutrality of forum did not seem to
inconvenience one party any more than the other and repre-
sented a reasonable compromise under the circumstances.' 5
Realistically, it is unlikely that a party will be able to prove
serious inconvenience-"effective denial of a meaningful day in
court"-merely because the chosen forum would be more in-
convenient and expensive; after all, the assumption is that if
the chosen forum is slightly inconvenient, the party must have
received consideration in return for making this agreement to
its detriment.' 5 To demonstrate serious inconvenience and
thus unreasonableness it will probably be necessary for the
party to prove that relegation to the chosen forum would oper-
ate to deny it an effective remedy. Justice Douglas' dissent
was reasoned somewhat along these lines. He felt that the Bisso
doctrine prohibiting limitation of liability for negligence in
towage contracts was applicable, and that since English courts
do not apply such a rule, to compel Zapata to litigate in the
foreign forum would materially affect its substantive rights.' 7
152 407 U.S. at 15-16.
" Id. at 16.
' Id. at 19.
I5 Id.
"I See Central Contracting Co. v. C.E. Youngdahl & Co., 209 A.2d 810, 816 (Pa.
1965).
"1 407 U.S. at 20-24 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Douglas also indicated that the
action of Unterweser in seeking a limitation action was effective consent to the jurisdic-
tion of the district court.
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VI. OTHER FACTORS
The decision in Zapata means that the reasonableness test
has truly arrived. As indicated in Section III, above, the road
to acceptance has not been without obstacles. Progressive opin-
ions supporting the reasonableness test in spite of the contrary
common law approach have been, of course, tremendously in-
fluential. But there have been other institutions that have
pressed for a change in the traditional rule and that have re-
flected the changes which occurred. Consideration of these
sources-the Hague Convention on Choice of Court, the
Model Choice of Forum Act, the Uniform Commercial Code,
and the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws-has been
postponed to this point because of the instruction they offer
concerning reasonableness and because of the need to consider
them along with the discussion of reasonableness in the next
section.
The Hague Convention on the Choice of Court was ap-
proved by the 10th Session of the Hague Conference on Private
International Law in 1964. 8 It adopted the view that choice of
forum provisions are presumptively valid both in prorogative
and derogative senses and that no court other than the selected
one should entertain an action covered by the agreement with
the exception of certain defined situations. An analogy to the
reasonableness approach is found in article 4 which provides
that "[t]he agreement on the choice of court shall be void or
voidable if it has been obtained by an abuse of economic power
or other unfair means." '59 This language gives the court consid-
erable leeway to determine whether it would be just to uphold
the choice of forum. Professor Reese calls it a "safety
valve"'-but it is still somewhat narrower than the discretion
allowed the court under the American approach. Other excep-
tional situations include a nonexclusive choice of forum and
those cases in which a nonselectedcourt is required by statute
to hear the suit."'1 Finally, the Convention is expressly made
inapplicable to areas which are traditionally thought to be of
"I The text of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court may be found in 4 INT'L
LEGAL MAT. 348-49 (1965).
's' 4 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 348 (1965).
Reese, supra note 4, at 204.
" HAGUE CONVENTION ON CHOICE OF COURT art. 6 (1964).
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peculiar local concern and where important local public policy
considerations are likely to be operative, including matters
concerning family law, succession, insolvency proceedings, and
rights in immovable property. 6 2
The Hague Convention has been ratified by only one state,
Israel, as far as can be determined, and one authority says that
ratifications are not seriously expected in the future although
the reason for this is not evident.'63 Its significance, however,
lies in its indication of the increasing acceptance of the idea
that choice of forum agreements are presumptively valid and
will be enforced absent a showing of good reason to contravene
the stipulation of the parties.
The Hague Convention also influenced the American
Model Choice of Forum Act,' 4 which was based on its provi-
sions. The Model Act also provides that an unselected court
must give effect to the choice of the parties and refuse to enter-
tain the action unless designated circumstances exist'65 as well
as giving validity to the prorogation aspects of such an agree-
ment.6 ' The Act contains a built-in reasonableness test in that
it provides that a court may refuse to give effect to the parties'
choice of forum if it finds that:
* . . (2) the plaintiff cannot secure effective relief in the
other state, for reasons other than delay in bringing the ac-
tion;
(3) the other state would be a substantially less convenient
place for the trial of the action than this state;
(4) the agreement as to the place of the action was obtained
by misrepresentation, duress, the abuse of economic power,
or other unconscionable means; or
(5) it would for some other reason be unfair or unreasonable
to enforce the agreement.'67
2 Id. at art. 2.
"I Nadelman, supra note 33, at 132. In another international development, a
United Nations committee on international trade working on a revision of the Bill of
Lading Convention of 1924 has suggested that choice of forum clauses should contain
several alternative fora to insure fairness to both parties. Id. at 134-35.
"I The text of the Act may be found in Reese, The Model Choice of Forum Act,
17 AM. J. COMP. L. 292 (1969). The MODEL ACT has been adopted by only four states
in the United States: Illinois, Nebraska, New Hampshire, and North Dakota. 1974
HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 951(d), 1020 (1974).
665 MODEL CHOICE OF FORUM ACT, § 2 (1968).
Id. at § 3.
I67 d.
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It is evident that the Model Act is much broader in its excepted
situations than the Hague Convention and gives much more
discretion to the court in its determination of whether to en-
force the choice.'68 These exceptions constitute the basic Amer-
ican test of reasonableness and will be discussed in more detail
in the next section.
Another significant influence on the general area of party
autonomy has been the Uniform Commercial Code. Although
the U.C.C. does not deal specifically with choice of forum, its
liberal provisions on choice of law by the parties"6 9 and its near
universal acceptance have served to advance the cause of party
autonomy in the choice of forum as well.17
Finally, the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws pro-
mulgated in 1971 reflects the legal trend in its adoption of the
reasonableness test. Section 80 provides that: "The parties'
agreement as to the place of the action cannot oust a state of
judicial jurisdiction, but such an agreement will be given effect
unless it is unfair or unreasonable."' IT The prestige of the
American Law Institute, the promulgator of the Restatement,
and the frequency of court citation of the Restatement indicate
the tremendous influence which the document has.17 Its posi-
tion on choice of forum agreement is both an indication of the
better rule and a potent influence for its adoption in the future.
'" See Reese, The Model Choice of Forum Act, 17 Am. J. COMP. L. 292 (1969).
' § 1-105(1) provides that" . . . when a transaction bears a reasonable relation
to this state and also to another state or nation the parties may agree that the law
either of this state or of such other state or nation shall govern their rights and duties."
Some might deny that § 1-105 is "liberal" in its choice of law provisions because of
the requirement that the contractual transaction have a "reasonable relation" to the
state whose law is chosen. Irrespective of whether the provision is characterized as
"liberal" or "restrictive," a fair case may be made for the position that a provision
choosing the law of a state which has no reasonable relation to the transaction violates
due process. See Subsection VIII B, infra. The requirement of "reasonable relation"
may be of constitutional necessity. What many undoubtedly characterize as more
restrictive than the traditional rule is the further provision in §1-105 that absent choice
by the parties the law of the forum shall be applied where the transaction has an
"appropriate relation" to the forum. However, the rule when the parties do choose is
relatively tolerant of party autonomy. For construction of the terms "reasonable rela-
tion" and "appropriate relation," see Annot., 63 A.L.R.3d 341. (1975).
I" See generally Nordstrom, Choice of Law and the Uniform Commercial Code,
24 OHIO ST. L.J. 364 (1963).
"' RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 80 (1971).
17 See M. PRICE & H. BITTNER, EFFECTIVE LEGAL RESEARCH 273 (1969).
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VII. THE REASONABLENESS TEST AND OTHER DEFENSES TO THE
CHOICE
The modern American rule, as indicated in the Restate-
ment (Second) of Conflict of Laws, the Model Act, and the
leading cases, is that courts should give effect to the parties'
choice of a particular forum and refuse to entertain an action
outside the chosen forum unless it would be unfair or unreason-
able to do so. Because of this, a basic defense of a party seeking
to maintain an action in contravention of a forum selection
agreement is that the choice is unreasonable. It is necessary,
then, to determine the parameters of reasonableness and the
factors which will lead a court to deny effectiveness to a choice
of forum agreement on grounds of unreasonableness.
Functionally, the disparate elements of reasonableness
identified in the cases and other writings may be divided into
four basic groups: that the chosen forum is a substantially less
convenient place for trial, that the plaintiff may be unable to
obtain effective relief in the chosen forum, that the choice of
forum agreement is unconscionable, and that the agreement is
otherwise unreasonable. It might also be noted that although
the elements are stated separately in the Model Act, they often
overlap and may not always be analytically different.
A. Substantial Inconvenience
The Model Act provides that a nonselected court should
not give effect to the choice if the chosen forum would be a
"substantially less convenient place for the trial" than the in-
stant forum.'73 This defense will not be successful in the usual
case, because the presumption is that consideration was re-
ceived at the time of contracting for the alleged inconveni-
ence '7 and the party should get what he bargained for unless
it is otherwise unfair. Therefore, this element of serious incon-
venience, as in Zapata, merges somewhat into considerations
of denial of effective remedy.'75 In Brown v. Gingiss Int'l.,
,3 MODEL CHOICE OF FORUM ACT § 3(3) (1968).
"I See Central Contracting Co. v. C.E. Youngdahl & Co., 209 A.2d 810, 816 (Pa.
1965).
I' See text accompanying notes 153-56, supra.
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Inc.,"'7 the plaintiff lived in Wisconsin while the chosen forum
was Chicago.' 77 The federal district court sitting in Wisconsin,
in enforcing the choice and ordering a change of venue to the
selected forum, 7 8 pointed out that the distance from plaintiff's
domicile was short, and that the additional cost of obtaining
local counsel in Chicago was insufficient to show the significant
inconvenience necessary to render the choice unreasonable. 79
However, there are some instances in which the chosen
forum, even though due consideration was presumably given in
the negotiation, is so manifestly inconvenient for all in-
volved-the court, parties, and witnesses-as to be unfair and
unreasonable. In Hawaii Credit Card Corp. v. Continental
Credit Card Corp.,'80 the parties had entered into a contract
whereby the defendant granted plaintiff exclusive sales rights
for Hawaii for memberships in a credit card program. The fran-
chise agreement had a clause providing that any dispute under
the contract would be determined in California courts applying
California law. The defendant allegedly breached the contract
by granting a similar franchise to another, and the plaintiff
sued in Hawaii federal district court.'8' The federal district
court refused to uphold the choice of forum provision due to its
unreasonableness. The court reasoned that the chosen forum
would be a seriously inconvenient place for the trial because
the business in question was in Hawaii and all witnesses and
evidence concerning the alleged wrongful acts were also in
Hawaii.' 2 Further, the chosen forum was not completely neu-
tral since the defendant was located there, nor did it have any
special expertise in the matter to be determined. To hold the
trial there would have presented problems for most of its par-
ticipants.'83
,' 360 F. Supp. 1042 (E.D. Wis. 1973).
Id.
" Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1970).
,' 360 F. Supp. at 1044. See also Central Contracting Co. v. Maryland Casualty
Co., 367 F.2d 341, 344-45 (3d Cir. 1966).
, 290 F. Supp. 848 (D. Hawaii 1968).
"' Id. at 849-51.
, Id. at 851-52.
,' The facts of this case might also suggest an adhesive situation or at least a
provision to which little attention was given and underscores the statement made in
the text above concerning the overlapping of the elements of unreasonableness. The
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The federal district court in Copperweld Steel Co. v.
Demag-Mannesmann-Boehler'84 reasoned along similar lines.
This case involved a contract for the sale and construction of a
plant on plaintiff's property in Ohio by a German corporation
with a choice of forum clause designating German courts. The
plaintiff claimed that the plant's performance was unsatisfac-
tory and sued in Pennsylvania for breach of contract."5 The
court applied the reasonableness test of Youngdahl and
Maryland Casualty and determined that the choice of forum
clause was unreasonable. The court noted that the plant was
fabricated in the United States; that all records concerning its
operation, as well as the plant operators, were here; that plain-
tiff's contract negotiation personnel and defendant's sales per-
sonnel involved in the transaction were here; and that since the
transaction had previously been conducted in English and
most witnesses were English speaking, it would be very incon-
venient to relegate the cause to a German court and "require
translation with its inherent inaccuracy."' 80 Implicit in this
reasoning was the thought that the German forum would be a
seriously inconvenient place for the trial. These courts seem to
be applying a basic forum non conveniens test,"" which will, on
the proper facts, override the voluntary choice of forum made
by the parties.' 8
B. Denial of an Effective Remedy
A second indication of unreasonableness is that the plain-
tiff will be unable to obtain effective relief, for whatever reason,
in the chosen forum. 88 A comment to the Model Act states that
adhesive situation brings up the question of the court's function in an arm's length
transaction: should the agreement be enforced, or should relief be given to one party?
When the court does give relief, is it protecting a party from overreaching, or is it
provincially protecting a party that did not know what it was doing by entering into a
bad bargain?
,' 54 F.R.D. 539 (W.D. Pa. 1972).
" Id. at 540.
' Id. at 542.
'8 See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947); F. JAMES, CIvIL PROCEDURE
§ 12.17 (1965).
l' See text accompanying notes 39-47, supra, for a discussion of forum non con-
veniens and choice of forum.
"' MODEL CHOICE OF FORUM ACT § 3(2) (1968).
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this will probably be consistent with the parties' intentions
because "[they can hardly have intended to require the
plaintiff to bring suit in a state where he could at no time have
obtained effective relief,"'90 and this seems to be a reasonable
assumption. 9 ' For instance, in Calzavara v. Biehl & Co.,192 a
Louisiana resident bought a ticket for passage on an Italian
ship, and the ticket contained a provision expressly conferring
exclusive jurisdiction for any dispute resolution on the courts
of Venice, Italy. The Louisiana court refused to give effect to
the choice of forum stipulation in a suit against the shipping
company's local agent, a Louisiana corporation, on the ground
that enforcement of the choice of forum provision would deny
the plaintiff a remedy since the Italian court would not exercise
"effective" judicial jurisdiction in this instance.1 3 The Muller
court was also faced with this contention, and in determining
that the plaintiff would not be denied an effective remedy in
the chosen forum considered the measure of damages the cho-
sen forum would apply, whether the action would be unduly
restricted, and the general potential for a fair and just adjudi-
cation. '94 The plaintiff might also be denied a meaningful rem-
edy where the chosen court is unable to get jurisdiction, 9 '
where the chosen forum's judgment would be potentially unen-
forceable, 9' or where it is otherwise uncertain that the defen-
dant would appear in the chosen forum.' 9 This element of de-
nial of an effective remedy may be conceived either as a denial
of due process or as unconscionable in the enforcement of such
a one-sided agreement.
"I Id., comment on § 3(2). But see Sedler, The Contracts Provisions of The Re-
statement (Second): An Analysis and a Critique, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 279, 291-93 (1972).
"I But cf. Sedler, supra note 190, at 291-93.
"92 181 So. 2d 809 (La. App. 1966).
"3 Id. at 811. Again, this could be construed as an adhesive situation; see subsec-
tion VII C, infra.
"' Wm. H. Muller & Co. v. Swedish American Line Ltd., 224 F.2d 806, 808 (2d
Cir. 1955). See also discussion in text accompanying notes 153-56, supra.
"I Cowens & Da Costa, supra note 27, at 180; Casenote, 11 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
LAW 449, 454-55 (1972).
96 Reese, supra note 4, at 203.
" Casenote, 11 CoLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L LAW 449, 454-55 (1972).
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C. Unconscionability
Another component of a consideration of unreasonableness
is whether the contract containing the choice of forum clause
"was obtained by misrepresentation, duress, abuse of economic
power, or other unconscionable means."'' 8 This would include,
first of all, the defenses of fraud, duress, or other unconsciona-
bility which are all regularly used to invalidate contractual
provisions'99 and which present no particular problem. Almost
everyone agrees that a contract obtained by fraudulent means
should not be enforced. It would also encompass, however,
adhesion ("take-it-or-leave-it") contracts resulting from an
inequality of bargaining power and its consequent abuse."' Al-
though such contracts are often enforced in other contexts,0 '
apparently the potential for unfairness in the choice of forum
situation is such that an exception to the general rule of en-
forcement is applied. Functionally, of course, the problem of
adhesion contracts is part of the larger issue of unconsciona-
bility.
The fear of the courts in this context is that the absence
of equal bargaining power might indicate that the weaker party
did not freely consent to the choice of forum clause. If he
wanted the goods or services, or whatever the economically
superior party offered, he was compelled to accept the terms
dictated by the other party. Consequently, there was no real
agreement and the presumption of due consideration is shaken.
The commentators are in general agreement that choice of
forum provisions contained in contracts of adhesion may con-
"' MODEL CHOICE OF FORUM ACT § 3(4) (1968).
,90 Cf. Sedler, supra note 190, at 293.
For the general theory of adhesion contracts, see Kessler, Contractsof Adhe-
sion: Some Thoughts about Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. Rav. 629 (1943);
EHRENZWEIG, supra note 5, at 456-57. Basically, an adhesion contract is a standardized
contract, usually favoring the offeror, offered continually to any number of offerees by
an offeror who possesses superior economic bargaining power, the terms to which the
offeree must agree if he wants the product either because the offeror is in a monopolis-
tic position or because all purveyors of the desired goods or services include such terms.
It is dictation of contractual terms by the party in a superior (usually economic)
bargaining position to which anyone wishing to acquire the product must "adhere."
See also Bolgar, Contracts of Adhesion: A Comparison of Theory and Practice, 20 AM.
J. COMP. L. 53 (1972); Henningson v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960)
(an adhesion contract evidences no true agreement).
2' See Sedler, supra note 190, at 290-91.
[Vol. 65
CHOICE OF FORUM CLAUSES
stitute the requisite unreasonableness and justify a court's re-
fusal to give effect to the choice.2 12 Furthermore in Zapata the
Supreme Court felt constrained to emphasize the equal bar-
gaining position of the parties, the "arms-length negotiation by
experienced and sophisticated businessmen, '20 3 to negative the
adhesion contract argument.
Matthiessen v. National Trailer Convoy, Inc.,20 4 serves to
illustrate the application of this theory. This case was an action
for personal injuries brought against the owner of a moving
van. The owner denied negligence and joined the lessee of the
van as a third-party defendant, contending that the lease
agreement provided that the lessee would defend and indem-
nify the owner for claims arising from the van's operation. The
lease agreement included a provision designating the Fulton
County, Georgia courts as the exclusive forum for dispute reso-
lution under the lease. 25 The federal district court applied the
reasonableness test to the choice of forum provision, and deter-
mined that the choice was unreasonable because "it is doubtful
that the jurisdictional limitation was equally bargained for. '26
That is to say, the choice is unreasonable and unfair and thus
undeserving of a voluntary exercise of judicial discretion in
refusing to take jurisdiction which the court otherwise has if
the choice of forum provision appears in an adhesion contract.
202 E.g., R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 18, at 164; Lenhoff, supra note 6, at 438; Reese,
supra note 11, at 537; The Contractual Forum at 189.
' The Breman v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12 (1972).
20 294 F. Supp. 1132 (D. Minn. 1968).
205 Id. at 1132-33.
2" Id. at 1135. The court also noted that the exclusive forum stipulation was
probably unreasonable on other grounds as well, viz., that the third-party plaintiff
(owner) would be denied a remedy if the agreement were enforced because of the
additional expense of litigating in the chosen forum. Id. That is, the third-party plain-
tiff will be denied an effective remedy should the provision be given effect. However,
the fact that a party will incur the additional expense litigating in the chosen forum
is generally not sufficient standing alone. See Brown v. Gingiss Int'l, Inc., 360 F. Supp.
1042, 1044 (E.D. Wis. 1973); Central Contracting Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 367
F.2d 341, 344-45 (3d Cir. 1966); and text accompanying notes 173-179, supra. To
overcome the presumption of due consideration for the inconvenience, it is necessary
to demonstrate the invalidity of the consideration, i.e., that there was no true "agree-
ment" because the inequality of bargaining power resulted in an adhesion contract.
See Henningson v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960). However, where
it is alleged that compelling a party to litigate in the chosen forum would completely
deny a remedy because of cost rather than simply being more expensive it is conceiva-
ble that this might of itself invalidate the choice.
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Matthiessen is further complicated because the plaintiff
was not a party to the forum selection provision, thus present-
ing the question of whether two parties may stipulate a forum
to cover all eventualities in their transaction even when it
would operate on one who was not a party to the agreement.
Matthiessen seems to indicate that the contracting parties can-
not do so. The third-party dimension does not weaken the opin-
ion's support of the unconscionability element, however, be-
cause the question could have involved only the relationship of
the contracting parties with each other.
D. Other Indications of Unreasonableness
The remaining elements of unreasonableness in the choice
of forum context may be considered in a broad, general manner
where, in the words of the Model Act, "it would for some other
reason be unfair or-unreasonable to enforce the agreement.) 207
Cases involving significant inconvenience,00 for instance,
might also be considered as otherwise unreasonable. Of course,
the party resisting the enforcement of the choice of forum pro-
vision must "clearly show" the unreasonableness or unfairness
of the choice. 219
Another indication of unreasonableness might be where a
chosen forum would apply a rule of law which was materially
different from the rule of substantially interested states.2 1° The
basic issue here is whether a choice of forum clause can in fact
operate as a choice of law provision. The probable American
view is that the choice of forum is a separate aspect and that
choice of law will not be presumed from choice of forum. The
court will apply its choice of law rules to determine the applica-
ble law notwithstanding its selection as the exclusive forum by
agreement of the parties. Therefore, where this approach is
applied, the court which refuses to entertain the action on the
basis of a choice of forum provision need not be concerned with
207 MODEL CHOICE OF FORuMt ACT § 3(5) (1968).
20 Copperweld Steel Co. v. Demag-Mannesmann-Boehler, 54 F.R.D. 539 (W.D.
Pa. 1972); Hawaii Credit Card Corp. v. Continental Credit Card Corp., 290 F. Supp.
848 (D. Hawaii 1968).
21 Roach v. Hapag-Lloyd, A.G., 358 F. Supp. 481 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
210 Reese, supra note 11, at 537. For a more extensive discussion, see subsection
VII A, infra.
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the rule of law to be applied by the chosen forum, assuming a
rational choice of law rule, because the chosen forum will, in
its choice of law determination, consider the interests of other
states concerned with the matter. In contract law, at any rate,
American jurisdictions give consideration to these interests
under the "localizing approach" to the choice of law based on
factual contracts .21
Where for some reason the chosen forum would not give
consideration to the interests of concerned states in its choice
of law determination, however, but would apply a rule which
is materially different from those of the concerned
states-whether it is the forum's own rule or not-the court
which is asked to dismiss or stay its exercise of jurisdiction is
confronted with a significant problem. On the one hand, the
parties to the contract presumably knew the choice of law rules
of the chosen forum, and their agreement to use it for dispute
resolution is tacit consent to application of its choice of law
rules. On the other hand, the court being asked to exercise its
discretion and dismiss the action should not permit the choice
of forum to designate the applicable law where it would not
allow an express choice of law to do SO. 2 12 For instance in
Zapata, had the court determined that the London Court of
Justice, a totally disinterested forum, would apply a rule con-
trary to the rule of the interested states, 213 it could be argued
that it should not have enforced the choice since it would not
have allowed the parties to choose to apply the law of a com-
pletely disinterested state. The general view is that the state
whose law is chosen must have a reasonable relationship to the
transaction.2 1 1 Under this view, the court would have denied
effect to the choice of the forum provision.
Furthermore, if the rule to be applied by the chosen juris-
diction is contrary to a strong underlying policy of the rule of
the nonchosen forum, the latter may refuse to give effect to the
choice on public policy grounds regardless of whether the cho-
211 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICr OF LAWS § 188 (1972); Sedler, supra
note 190, at 300.
"I See Reese, supra note 11, at 539.
212 The United States was the place of incorporation of Zapata and Germany was
the place of incorporation of Unterweser.
2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(a) (1971).
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sen forum is disinterested or not, or whether it would consider
the interests of concerned states.25 Again, this is an application
of the rule that the court should not permit the choice of forum
provision to do what it would not let a choice of law clause do.
Thus, if the court would not give effect to choice of a certain
state's law on public policy grounds, it should not enforce a
choice of forum which would accomplish the same thing.
Also, if the chosen forum would apply a rule which was
contrary to the rule of all interested states, the party resisting
the agreement might well argue that to relegate him to such a
forum would deny him due process. 26 Generally, a forum which
lacks any contacts with a transaction may not apply its own
law to decide the controversy. 27 This argument could be ap-
plied to Zapata had the American rule of invalidity of exculpa-
tory clauses not been held inapplicable and had the German
rule been consonant with the American rule. There was evi-
dence that the English rule would uphold the exculpatory
clause in the contract and that the English court would apply
this rule notwithstanding its lack of contacts. 218 Therefore, if
the rule of the only two interested states, the United States and
Germany, were contrary, a due process argument might suc-
cessfully be made.
Another defense to the application of the prima facie va-
lidity rule is actually unrelated to reasonableness. In general,
where the plaintiff had a choice of forum by statute, or where
a court is statutorily required to hear an action, a choice of
forum agreement to the contrary is inoperative.2 19 For instance,
in Boyd v. Grand Trunk Western R.R. Co., 2 1 the Supreme
Court held that the Federal Employers Liability Act provision
allowing an employee to bring suit in state or federal district
court where the defendant resides, where the defendant does
business, or where the cause of action arose22' voids an exclusive
choice of forum agreement limiting the plaintiff's forum to the
225 Reese, supra note 11, at 537.
226 See discussion in subsection VII B, infra.
217 Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
21 407 U.S. at 23.
229 See MODEL CHOICE OF FORUM ACT § 3(1) (1968).
338 U.S. 263 (1949).
45 U.S.C. § 56 (1970).
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jurisdiction where the cause of action arose.222 Also, in Wilko
v. Swan,2 2 the Supreme Court refused to enforce an arbitration
clause in a sale of securities contract on the ground that the
Securities Act of 1933 allows a purchaser to "sue in any court
of competent jurisdiction" 24 upon an allegation of a violation
of the provisions of the Act, and that such an agreement was
an attempt to waive compliance with the Act and was conse-
quently void by express provision in the Act itself.25 This rea-
soning was applied to a choice of forum provision in a securities
sales contract by the Seventh Circuit in 1973.228 However, in
1974, the Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit and
limited the scope of the Wilko exception when it held, in
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 22 that an arbitration provision
in an international sale of securities agreement did not violate
the Securities Act provision referred to above. 28 The majority
reasoned that the considerations and policies involved in Wilko
were materially different when the contract is international in
context.
229
22 338 U.S. at 265. See also Krenger v. Pennsylvania R.R., 174 F.2d 556 (2d Cir.
1949).
- 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
-4 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1970).
2 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1970).
211 Alberto-Culver Co. v. Scherk, 484 F.2d 611 (7th Cir. 1973).
417 U.S. 506 (1974).
22 15 U.S.C. §§ 77n, 771(2) (1970).
22 417 U.S. at 515-18. The Court stated that:
[Riespondent's reliance on Wilko . . .ignores the significant and, we find,
crucial differences between the agreement involved in Wilko and the one
signed by the parties here. Alberto-Culver's contract to purchase the busi-
ness entities belonging to Scherk was a truly international agreement.
Alberto-Culver is an American corporation with its principal place of busi-
ness and the vast bulk of its activity in this country, while Scherk is a citizen
of Germany whose companies were organized under the laws of Germany and
Liechtenstein. The negotiations leading to the signing of the contract in
Austria and to the closing in Switzerland took place in the United States,
England, and Germany, and involved consultations with legal and trade-
mark experts from each of those countries and from Liechtenstein. Finally,
and most significantly, the subject matter of the contract concerned the sale
of business enterprises organized under the laws of and primarily situated
in European countries, and whose activities were largely, if not entirely,
directed to European markets.
Such a contract involves considerations and policies significantly differ-
ent from those found controlling in Wilko. In Wilko, quite apart from the
arbitration provision, there was no question but that the laws of the United
1976]
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It might be posited, then, that the prima facie validity of
a choice of forum provision does not extend to situations in
which the choice encroaches to any extent on a statutory right
to litigate in a particular or alternative forum. A closer analysis
belies this position, however. Venue of any action is controlled
by statute; and to give derogatory effect to a forum selection
clause is bound to encroach on the venue statute. The probable
explanation is that the specific cases in which the courts would
not allow a forum selection provision to render a statutory
venue provision ineffective involved matters which the courts
felt were affected in some fashion with the public interest (e.g.,
the securities cases), or in which the courts especially feared
superior bargaining power (e.g., F.E.L.A. cases).20
States generally, and the federal securities laws in particular, would govern
disputes arising out of the stock purchase agreement. The parties, the nego-
tiations, and the subject matter of the contract were all situated in this
country, and no credible claim could have been entertained that any interna-
tional conflict-of-laws problems would arise. In this case, by contrast, in the
absence of the arbitration provision considerable uncertainty existed at the
time of the agreement, and still exists, concerning the law applicable to the
resolution of disputes arising out of the contract. [footnote omitted]
Such uncertainty will almost inevitably exist with respect to any con-
tract touching two or more countries, each-with its own substantive laws and
conflict-of-law rules. A contractual provision specifying in advance the
forum in which disputes shall be litigated and the law to be applied is,
therefore, an almost indispensable precondition to achievement of the order-
liness and predictability essential to any international business transaction.
Furthermore, such a provision obviates the danger that a dispute under the
agreement might be submitted to a forum hostile to the interests of one of
the parties or unfamiliar with the problem area involved. [footnote omitted]
The exception to the clear provisions of the Arbitration Act carved out
by Wilko is simply inapposite to a case such as the one before us. In Wilko
the Court reasoned that "[w]hen the security buyer, prior to any violation
of the Securities Act, waives his right to sue in courts, he gives up more than
would a participant in other business transactions. The security buyer has a
wider choice of courts and venue. He thus surrenders one of the advantages
the Act gives him . . . .. 346 U.S. at 435. In the context of an international
contract, however, these advantages become chimerical since, as indicated
above, an opposing party may by speedy resort to a foreign court block or
hinder access to the American court of the purchaser's choice. [footnote
omitted]
Justice Douglas, joined by Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall, dissented, pointing
out that "The virtue of certainty in international agreements may be important, but
Congress has dictated that when there are sufficient contacts for our securities laws to
apply, the policies expressed in those laws takes precedence." 417 U.S. at 534.
See, e.g., Boyd v. Grand Trunk W. R.R. Co., 338 U.S. 263 (1949); Wilko v.
Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
19761 CHOICE OF FORUM CLAUSES
VIII. CHOICE OF FORUM AND CHOICE OF LAW: A POLICY
CENTERED APPROACH
In deciding whether to give effect to a forum selection
agreement, it is most unusual for a court to consider the impli-
cations of forum selection on the law to be applied in the resolu-
tion of the dispute.2' Moreover, when the issue is examined at
all, it is generally done tangentially in a discussion of whether
the plaintiff would be denied an effective remedy because of an
adverse effect on his substantive rights, 232 an apparently ob-
lique manner of saying that the law which the chosen forum
would probably apply would oppose a strong public policy of
the nonchosen forum. 233 This appears to be a very important
matter for a court to evaluate when it is asked to demur from
exercising its jurisdiction, especially since parties often com-
plement the choice of forum provision with an express choice
of law, designating the law of the chosen forum .234 Indeed, even
without such an express choice of law, the chosen forum might
imply a choice of its substantive law from the choice of
forum. 235 The fact that it is not considered could indicate that
"I For example, in the following cases there was absolutely no indication that the
laws of the concerned states differed or which law would be applied if the choice were
effectuated. Furbee v. Vantage Press, Inc., 464 F.2d 835 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Central
Contracting Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 367 F.2d 341 (3rd Cir. 1966); Carbon Black
Export v. The S.S. Monrosa, 254 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1958); Wm. H. Muller & Co. v.
Swedish American Line Ltd., 224 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1955); Davis v. Pro Basketball, Inc.,
381 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y., 1974); Brown v. Gingiss Int'l, Inc., 360 F. Supp. 1042 (E.D.
Wis. 1973); Copperweld Steel Co. v. Demag-Mannesman-Boehler, 54 F.R.D. 539 (W.D.
Pa. 1972); Hawaii Credit Card Corp. v. Continental Credit Card Corp., 290 F. Supp.
848 (D. Hawaii 1968); Beirut Universal Bank v. Superior Court, 74 Cal. Rptr. 333
(1969); Reeves v. The Chem Industrial Co., 495 P.2d 729 (Ore. 1972); Central Contract-
ing Co. v. C.E. Youngdahl & Co., 209 A.2d 810 (Pa. 1965).
211 See, e.g., The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 23 (1972) (Douglas,
J., dissenting).
2 See text accompanying note 261, infra.
23 See, e.g., Furbee v. Vantage Press, Inc., 464 F.2d 835 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Central
Contracting Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 367 F.2d 341 (3d Cir. 1966); Win. H. Muller
& Co. v. Swedish American Line Ltd., 224 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1955); Beirut Universal
Bank v. Superior Court, 74 Cal. Rptr. 333 (1969); Reeves v. The Chem Industrial Co.,
495 P.2d 729 (Ore. 1972).
2 See, e.g., Compagnie d'Armenment Maritime S.A. v. Compagnie Tunisienne
de Navigation S.A., [1971] A.C. 572, 589, 597-98, 605-07 (H.L.) (indicating that there
is a rebuttable presumption that an arbitration clause implies intent to choose the law
of the place of arbitration although in this case the presumption was rebutted); Lum-
mus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Refining Co., 280 F.2d 915, 924 (1st Cir. 1960) (arbitra-
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the laws of the chosen forum and the nonchosen forum differ
only infrequently. However, the parties are undoubtedly often
fighting over more than the extra expense of bringing the action
at another place, and the application of a different rule by the
chosen forum could, of course, have a drastic effect on the
outcome of the dispute. Since the nonchosen forum which is
asked to effectuate the choice of the parties and refuse to enter-
tain the action is usually either the domicile, state of national-
ity, residence, or principal place of business of the plaintiff,05
the application of a rule by the chosen forum which would be
contrary to the plaintiff's interest should be carefully consid-
ered. 237
This consideration by the nonchosen court of the law to be
applied by the chosen court should proceed in two contexts.
First, the court should consider whether any strong policy of
the forum is involved, and, if so, whether the forum has an
interest in applying its law on the issue in question-either
because by applying its own law, the forum would advance its
own governmental interest, or because application of some
other law by the nonchosen forum would subvert the interest
of the forum.2 38 Second, the court should evaluate whether the
application of its law or of some other law by the chosen forum
would be fair to the parties.239 In other words, the court should
tion clause). The United States Supreme Court seemed to uphold this view when it
stated in dicta in a footnote that "[u]nder some circumstances, the designation of
arbitration in a certain place might also be viewed as implicitly selecting the law of
that place to apply to the transaction." Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Company, 417 U.S.
506, 519, n. 13 (1974). See also A. DICEY & J. Moams, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 735-36
(9th ed. 1973); Yntema, "Autonomy" in Choice of Law, 1 AM. J. COMP. L. 341, 352
(1952), for discussion on whether a choice of forum implies a choice of that forum's
law.
' The only cases found where the nonchosen forum was not the domicile, state
of nationality, residence, or principal place of business of the plaintiff were somewhat
aberrant anyway; e.g., where the plaintiff was an assignee of the original party to the
contract, Spatz v. Nascone, 364 F. Supp. 967 (W.D. Pa. 1973); where the plaintiff for
the particular contract was a third-party plaintiff, Roach v. Hapag-Lloyd, A.G., 358
F. Supp. 481 (N.D. Cal. 1973); or where the plaintiff, although nominally a resident
of the United States, had in the contract elected domicile in the chosen forum, Mitten-
thal v. Mascagin, 66 N.E. 425 (Mass. 1903).
u This type of problem is noted in Comment, 6 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 369,
377-79 (1973).
211 The basis of the "governmental interest analysis" espoused in the text is de-
rived from B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS chs. 2 & 4 (1963).
21 See the discussion in Sedler, supra note 190, at 302-15.
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apply an "interest and fairness" test grounded in the policy-
centered approach to the conflict of laws in evaluating the
effect of a choice of forum on the law to be applied in resolving
the dispute."' Assuming that such an approach is proper in the
usual choice of law context, it should also prove useful when
the applicable law is to be affected by an express choice of
forum.z 1 Since the cases do not generally attempt an analysis
of the law to be applied, 242 it is often unclear whether the laws
actually differ. For purposes of this discussion, then, a conflict
of laws will be hypothesized in the fact patterns of several cases
so that the effects of the varying results may be more easily
seen.
A. Analysis of Governmental Interests
There are five significant factors to be considered in an
analysis of governmental interests in the context of choice of
forum/choice of law. These are: 1) The domicile, nationality,
residence, or principal place of business of the party initiating
the action in the nonchosen forum (the plaintiff); 2) the do-
micile, nationality, residence, or principal place of business of
the party attempting to persuade the court to dismiss the ac-
tion pursuant to the express choice of court provision (the
defendant); 3) the location(s) of the transaction, which could
include the place(s) where negotiations occurred, the place of
making, and the place(s) of performance; 4) the chosen forum;
and 5) the forum where the action is initiated in contravention
of the forum selection agreement.'
210 Id. at 303-04, 314-15.
21 That the approach taken in this paper is based on a policy-centered methodol-
ogy does not mean that the basic issue cannot be assayed in a different manner. The
policy-centered methodology is used because I am more familiar with it, and because
in my opinion it is the most effective choice of law method. It cannot be denied,
however, that an appraisal of the relevant and significant factors can be effected by
other approaches. See, e.g., 2 A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 467-90 (1962); and R.
WEIN rRAUB, supra note 18, at 292, for an approach to choice of law contracts based
upon a validation rule (although admittedly still grounded in a policy-centered ap-
proach).
2 See note 231, supra.
2 The first four factors are variations on those identified by Professor Currie in
his discussion of the interest analysis approach in choice of law-contracts. B. CURRIE,
supra note 238, at 82-83. The fifth factor is significant only in the choice of forum
situation.
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With these factors in mind, we may attempt to categorize
the cases according to the differing ways these factors actually
occur. It should be remembered that the nonchosen forum is
almost invariably either the domicile, residence, state of na-
tionality, or principal place of business of the plaintiff.2" On
the surface at least, if application of its law would be beneficial
to the plaintiff, the court may see an interest in insuring it is
applied.245
The most common fact patterns in choice of forum cases
are those in which the plaintiff is from State A, the defendant
is from State B, the transaction has contacts (i.e., place of
negotiation, place of contracting, place of performance) with
both A and B, the selected forum is State B, and the plaintiff
chooses to litigate in State A in contravention of the forum
stipulation in the contract.246 Carbon Black Export, Inc., v. The
S.S. Monrosa,217 is a good example. There the plaintiff was an
American corporation,248 presumably with its principal place of
business in the United States.249 The defendants were an Ital-
ian ship, the S.S. Monrosa, (since the case was an in rem, or
libel action), and Navigazione Alta Italia, an Italian business
concern which was the libel respondent and owner of the
ship.20 The bills of lading for transport of 30,000 bags of carbon
black were executed in Houston, the port where the cargo was
loaded and from which it was shipped, and the points of destin-
2, See note 236, supra.
215 Cf. Sedler, Characterization, Identification of the Problem Area, and the
Policy-Centered Conflict of Laws: An Exercise in Judicial Method, 2 RUTGERS-CAMDEN
L.J. 8, 47-48, 62, 85, 100, where the author indicates that where the state of primary
reference (which "would seemingly have an interest in having its law applied to the
issue in question" (emphasis added) is the forum, it will almost invariably apply its
own law.
21' Furbee v. Vantage Press, Inc., 464 F.2d 835 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Carbon Black
Export v. The S.S. Monrosa, 254 F. 2d 297 (5th Cir. 1958); Win. H. Muller & Co. v.
Swedish American Line Ltd., 224 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1955); Davis v. Pro Basketball, Inc.,
381 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Brown v. Gingiss Int'l, Inc., 360 F. Supp. 1042 (E.D.
Wis. 1973); Hawaii Credit Card Corp. v. Continental Credit Card Corp., 290 F. Supp.
848 (D. Hawaii 1968); Beirut Universal Bank v. Superior Court, 74 Cal. Rptr. 333
(1969).
247 254 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1958). See text accompanying notes 81-84, supra.
21 The court used the term "American citizen." Id. at 298.
21g It is often necessary to "presume" factors thought significant to this analysis
because the courts generally fail to consider the issue of choice of law at all and many
such factors are not evident in the opinion.
211 254 F. 2d at 298, n. 4.
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ation were three ports in Italy.25' The transaction, then, had
contacts with both the United States and Italy. The bills of
lading provided for exclusive jurisdiction in the courts of
Genoa, Italy for any actions for damages due to nondelivery or
injury to the goods.252 The plaintiff, ignoring the forum selec-
tion provision, brought the libel action for damages in the Fed-
eral District Court for the Southern District of Texas, the
forum in which the contracts were executed and in which the
agreements were partially performed.
In Carbon Black, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district
court's decision to decline jurisdiction pursuant to the choice
of court provision on the traditional ground that forum selec-
tion agreements which purported to "oust" a court of jurisdic-
tion were violative of public policy and thus ineffective.2 3 This
decision, and especially the outmoded reasoning, has been crit-
icized above.24 Unfortunately, the Carbon Black court did not
consider the effect that the law which would be applied by the
chosen court would have in this situation, although such a
consideration would have been a way to rationalize the result,
and is now perhaps the only way since the United States Su-
preme Court in Zapata rejected the traditional judicial hostil-
ity to forum selection agreements in international maritime
contracts.2 5
'' Id. at 298.
212 The forum stipulation clause read:
Clause 27-Also, that no legal proceedings may be brought against the cap-
tain or ship owners or their agents in respect to any loss of or damage to any
goods herein specified, except in Genoa, it being understood and agreed that
every other Tribunal in the place or places where the goods were shipped or
landed is incompetent, notwithstanding that the ship may be legally repre-
sented there. Id. at 299.
'1 Id. at 300-01. See text accompanying note 59, supra. The Fifth Circuit also
noted that the district court's decision was "buttressed by the doctrine of forum non
conveniens", id. at 300, and disposed of this matter by implying that where the non-
chosen forum is just as convenient as the chosen forum, the doctrine of forum non
conveniens will not be applied to dismiss the action. Id. at 301, citing and quoting from
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1946). "But unless the balance is strongly in
favor of the defendant, the plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be disturbed." 330
U.S. at 508. That is, the doctrine of forum non conveniens is inapposite unless the
forum which the defendant seeks to have determine the cause is more convenient than
the instant forum. See text accompanying note 84, supra.
' See text accompanying notes 81-84, supra.
2 The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972). See text accompanying
notes 131-57, supra.
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To illustrate this, let us interject a conflict of laws into the
Carbon Black situation."' Suppose that the chosen forum in
Genoa, Italy would choose to apply its own law in this situa-
tion,27 and further suppose that the law to be applied would
insulate the defendant from liability unless the plaintiff could
prove willful and wanton negligence. Suppose that the Ameri-
can rule is that the plaintiff can recover on a showing of mere
negligence and further that the plaintiff cannot prove the
greater degree of negligence required by Italian law. Alterna-
tively, the conflict might occur if the bills of lading had in-
cluded a provision limiting the liability of the carrier, and the
Italian court would have given effect to such limitation, al-
though the American rule is that such limitations are invalid.2
In either case, this presents the classic "true conflict" situation
in terms of interest analysis, 5 in which each state involved has
an interest in having its law applied on the issue in question.
Here Italy's policy would be to protect carriers from liability
due to mere negligence or from excessive liability resulting
from damaged cargo, favoring them in this regard over shippers
who are somehow injured by their negligence. The United
States' policy, on the other hand, is to favor those who are
damaged by a carrier's negligence, either by allowing recovery
on proof of mere negligence, or by prohibiting liability limiting
provisions in shipping contracts-more broadly stated, the pol-
icy is to allow those injured by the negligent acts of another to
recover their losses from the culpable party. In this situation,
each state has a legitimate interest in applying its law to the
21' The phrase "conflict of laws" is used here in the sense that the content of the
laws of two interested states differ and that the result "were the case heard in the
courts of the state whose law is sought to be used as a model, would be different than
the result that would be reached under the substantive law of the forum." Sedler,
Babcock v. Jackson in Kentucky: Judicial Method and the Policy-Centered Conflict
of Laws, 56 Ky. L.J. 27, 95 (1967).
"I In fact, it appears that the bills of lading contained an express choice of law
provision, designating the law of the steamer and the Italian Commercial Code as the
governing law. 254 F.2d at 299, n. 4.
The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 46 U.S.C. § 1303 (8) (1970) provides:
Any clause, covenant, or agreement in a contract of carriage relieving the
carrier or the ship from liability for loss or damage to or in connection with
the goods, arising from negligence, fault, or failure in the duties and obliga-
tions provided in this section, or lessening such liability otherwise than as
provided in this chapter, shall be null and void and of no effect.
"I See generally B. CURRIE, supra note 238, at ch. 2.
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issue in question in order to advance the policy which underlies
its law. Italy has an interest in protecting Italian carriers from
excessive liability, and the United States has an interest in
allowing Americans who have been injured by the negligence
of another to be compensated.
Thus, had either of our hypothetical fact situations been
real, the Fifth Circuit would have been on solid theoretical
ground in refusing to recognize and give effect to the choice of
forum provision. By exercising its discretion and declining to
entertain the cause, the court would have been conceding ap-
plication of Italian law on an issue over which the forum had a
strong governmental interest. Professor Currie would say that
in the case of a true conflict the forum court should apply
forum law."' This is functionally the same as the forum favor-
ing application of its law in this situation because to allow
application of the law of Italy would be contrary to a strong
public policy of the forum."' Regardless of which justification
the court chooses, either is a rational basis to refuse to dismiss
the action because of the forum selection agreement and makes
a choice of forum provision "unreasonable" in the eyes of the
nonchosen forum. Either is also proper even in the face of an
express choice of law.262
The Carbon Black court, of course, did not consider the
ramifications of choice of forum on choice of law. Instead, the
court used an irrational reason, that forum selection agree-
ments violate public policy and should not be enforced, to
reach a rational (in the hypothetical case) result-the refusal
to dismiss pursuant to the choice of court and presumably the
10 Id. at 181-84. This is because Professor Currie felt that a court was not in a
position to "weigh" opposing interests when an interest of the forum is involved; that
such balancing of interests is not a judicial, but rather a legislative, function; and that
the only rational decision a court could make in such a situation, therefore, would be
to apply the law of the forum. Id.
281 See text accompanying notes 215 & 233, supra. Note, however, that this is
conceptually different from what is called the "public policy technique," which has
been characterized as the refusal of the forum to apply the foreign substantive law
which its choice of law rule dictates on the ground that it is against the public policy
of the forum. Sedler, supra note 245, at 51. For examples of the public policy technique,
see Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N.Y. 466, 3 N.E.2d 597 (1963); R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY
ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 58-61 (1971); H. GOODRICH & E. SCOLES, CONFLICT OF LAws
14-15 (1964).
" See Sedler, supra note 190 at 294-98.
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application of forum law-although some commentators might
apply Italian law in at least one of the hypothesized situa-
tions. 63 Whether forum law is ultimately applied, however, is
not as important as whether important forum interests are con-
sidered. The court might conclude that the forum interest is
not substantial, or if it is substantial, that it should be subordi-
nated. The important thing is that a strong public policy of the
forum evidenced in its law has been considered on its own
merits and not lost in the shuffle of merely giving effect or
failing to give effect to the forum selection agreement of the
parties.
A second fact pattern appearing in choice of forum cases
is that in which the plaintiff is from State A, the defendant
from State B, the transaction has contacts with both A and B,
the plaintiff chooses to litigate in his home state in contraven-
tion of the forum selection, and the selected forum is State C,
which has no factual contacts with the transaction other than
being the chosen forum. 214 Our vehicle for analysis here will be
The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Company,26 5 the facts of
which have been discussed extensively above.2 6 Briefly, the
plaintiff American corporation contracted with a German cor-
poration owning The Bremen to transport plaintiffs drilling rig
from Louisiana to the Adriatic Sea, off the coast of Italy
through a written contract which included an exculpatory
clause and a forum selection provision providing that all dis-
putes under the agreement would be brought before the Court
of Justice in London, England.2 7 The plaintiff brought a libel
action in the federal district court in Tampa, Florida, contrary
to the forum stipulation in the contract, after the rig had been
damaged during a storm in the Gulf of Mexico. Both the dis-
2'3 For example, the validation principle might uphold the application of Italian
law on the validity of the exculpatory provision, 2 A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS
467-90 (1962); R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 18, at 292; or Italian law could be chosen as
the law of the state of the most significant relationship, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188 (1971).
2,, The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972); Central Contracting
Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 367 F.2d 341 (3d Cir. 1966); Central Contracting Co.
v. C.E. Youngdahl & Co., 209 A.2d 810 (Pa. 1965).
25 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
2 See text accompanying notes 131-57, supra.
2,, 407 U.S. at 2-3.
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trict court"8 and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals26 refused
to give effect to the forum selection agreement. The Supreme
Court reversed, holding that the lower court should generally
uphold choice of forum clauses, and that such agreements are
"prima facie valid" absent a showing of unreasonableness. 20
Again, there was little consideration of the law which
would be applied by the selected forum. Only Justice Douglas
in dissent noted that "there is evidence in the present record
that [the exculpatory provision] is enforceable in England
[the chosen forum] .,27, If this is so, we need not hypothesize
a conflict of laws here; a real conflict exists because of the
American doctrine that liability exculpating provisions in mar-
itime towage contracts are unenforceable.2 12 But, this follows
only if we may assume that the English forum would have
applied English law-a not unreasonable assumption consider-
ing the English inclination to imply choice of law from choice
of forum as the "proper law" of the contract. 23 There is no
indication in the reports as to the law of Germany, the other
interested state as the place of incorproation of the defendant,
on the exculpatory provision. If it is consonant with the Ameri-
can rule, application of the contrary English rule by the chosen
court is all the more objectionable. This would present a situa-
tion where there was no conflict between the substantive law
of the interested states. But even if German law would recog-
nize such an exculpatory provision, it is at least conceivable
that its application would nonetheless be contrary to a strong
governmental interest, or, if you will, public policy, of the
United States as the forum state.
In this precise situation, however, it is arguable whether
the policy behind the American rule would be advanced by
application of American law, or subverted by application of a
contrary rule. The policy reasons supporting the so-called Bisso
doctrine of invalidity of exculpatory provisions in towage con-
tracts were identified in the case announcing the rule as:
1" 296 F. Supp. 733 (M.D. Fla. 1969).
21' 428 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970), aff'd en banc 446 F.2d 907 (5th Cir. 1971).
27 407 U.S. at 10.
Id. at 23.
Dixilyn Drilling Corp. v. Crescent Towing & Salvage Co., 372 U.S. 697 (1963);
Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp., 349 U.S. 85 (1955).
"' See note 235, supra.
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(1) to discourage negligence by making wrongdoers pay
damages; and
(2) to protect those in need of goods or services from being
overreached by others who have the power to drive hard bar-
gains. 2 74
Although not approaching the issue from the same perspective
as this article, Chief Justice Burger in the majority opinion in
Zapata made it clear that he did not believe that the United
States had a governmental interest, in light of the policies un-
derlying the rule, in having its law applied on the issue of the
enforceability of the exculpatory provision. The Chief Justice
wrote that there was no American interest in discouraging neg-
ligence which did not occur inside our territorial waters, and
there was no interest in protecting an American consumer who
bargained for a supplier's services in an arms-length transac-
tion.2 5 Thus, if this analysis is accepted, there is no govern-
mental interest to be advanced by application of the Bisso
doctrine or subverted by application of a contrary rule-or, as
the Chief Justice put it, it is not contrary to a strong public
policy of the United States. 27
However, Mr. Justice Douglas, in his dissent, did find that
the United States had an interest in applying its law on the
issue of the validity of the exculpatory clause. He reached this
result by citation to cases indicating that the law to be applied
to torts occurring in international waters is a general maritime
law as interpreted by the forum. 7' This is consonant with rea-
soning that the policy of discouraging negligence exists wher-
ever the negligent act occurs, especially when the injured party
is an American corporation and the transaction had other sig-
nificant factual contacts with the forum. If this reasoning is
accepted, there is definitely an interest in the United States
which would be impaired by the application of a contrary rule
and which would be advanced by application of the Bisso doc-
trine. Again, Germany may have had an interest in applying
27 Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp., 349 U.S. 85, 91 (1955), citing cases collected
in Annot., 175 A.L.R. 8 (1948).
" 407 U.S. at 15-16.
276 Id.
277 The Belgenland, 114 U.S. 355 (1885); The Scotland, 105 U.S. 24 (1881); The
Gylfe v. The Trujillo, 209 F.2d 386 (2d Cir. 1954).
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its law to this situation depending on the content of that law.
At most a true conflict would be presented if the German rule
is to uphold exculpatory clauses, because Germany would have
an interest in applying its rule to protect a German defendant.
If the German rule were consistent with the Bisso doctrine,
there would be no conflict of laws among the interested states.
In either situation, the application of American law to invali-
date the exculpatory provision would be defensible.27
In Zapata, the Court at least considered the policies and
interests involved in the choice of law, even if not directly
concerning itself with the law which would have been applied
by the chosen forum. The policies and interests were at least
recognized and evaluated. But a more thorough examination of
the effect of choice of forum on choice of law, as advocated
herein, would have forced the court to face the issue more
squarely and would have been preferable. Moreover, a determi-
nation of the issues in that light could well have changed the
result. 1
Copperweld Steel Co. v. Demag-Mannesman-Boehler2 0 is
a Carbon Black type case with a twist. The plaintiff was from
Pennsylvania, and the defendants were German corporations.
There is no indication where the negotiations for the contract
occurred, or where it was finally agreed to, nor were there any
factual contacts of the transaction to Pennsylvania other than
that it was the plaintiff's state of incorporation. The district
court, however, found that the defendants were doing business
in Pennsylvania and were thus subject to service of process
there.2 ' The contract was for the construction of a plant on the
plaintiff's property in Ohio. The court in Copperweld Steel
refused to effectuate the choice of forum provision in the con-
tract designating German courts, holding that it was unreason-
able in this situation. 282
In Copperweld the choice of law analysis is complicated
27A See notes 267-68, supra.
211 See discussion of fairness, subsection VIII B, infra.
- 54 F.R.D. 539 (W.D. Pa. 1972). See text accompanying notes 184-86, supra.
"I Id. at 541, pursuant to PA. STAT. tit. 15, § 2011 (1971 Supp.) (repealed in 1972),
applicable through FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e).
2" 54 F.R.D. at 542, citing, for the reasonableness test, Central Contracting Co.
v. Maryland Casualty Co., 367 F.2d 341 (3d Cir. 1966); Central Contracting Co. v. C.E.
Youngdahl & Co., 209 A.2d 810 (Pa. 1965). See text accompanying note 186, supra.
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from the outset because the domestic laws of the forum to be
applied by the federal district court283 probably could not be
applied constitutionally since there were no factual contacts
with that jurisdiction arising out of the transaction.?4 Again
there is no indication whether the law of any of the interested
jurisdictions differed in any respect. Since the issue was
whether the plant as constructed performed in the agreed-upon
manner, an apparent factual dispute, it is difficult to conceive
of a conflict of laws unless under German law a limitation of
liability would have been applied. Suppose that such was in
fact the case. Again, if the chosen court would apply its own
law and limit liability, a true conflict would be presented. Ger-
many would have an interest in applying its law to protect a
German corporation by limiting its liability in this type of situ-
ation, and Ohio would have an interest in seeing that those
injured by improper construction on Ohio real property are
compensated for their damages. But here the Pennsylvania
federal district court would be cast in the role of a disinterested
forum. In the true conflict situation, the court could make a
choice of law on the basis of "most significant contacts" ap-
proach of the Restatement 85 which, in this situation would
likely be Ohio law.88 Professor Currie would have the court of
the disinterested third state either dismiss on forum non con-
veniens grounds, or if this is not feasible, apply the law most
similar to its own.287 Conceivably the court could act as a super-
legislature and "weigh" the conflicting interests. The method
really does not matter so long as the interests are recognized
and considered in the judicial process.
The same type of analysis may be applied to choice of
forum cases involving a "false conflict" in terms of interest
analysis-cases in which only one state has an interest in
11 See Pennsylvania law under Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938),
and Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
"I Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930). See the discussion in Subsection
VII B, infra.
21 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188 (1971).
21S RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 196 (1971) provides that in a
contract for the rendition of services-which would presumably include a construction
contract-the place where the primary portion of the services are to be rendered is
presumed to have the most significant relationship.
21 B. CURRIE, supra note 238, at 120, n. 64.
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applying its law on the issue in question. For instance, in
Calzavara v. Biehl & Co.,2 8 the plaintiff, a Louisiana resident,
bought a ticket for passage on an Italian ship from the shipping
company's agent, the defendant, a Louisiana corporation. The
ticket was for transporation from New Orleans to Italy and
included a provision expressly conferring exclusive jurisdiction
for any dispute resolution on the courts of Venice, Italy.28
When the plaintiff's passage was cancelled without apparent
reason, he sued the defendant in Louisiana state court. The
Louisiana court refused to uphold the forum selection agree-
ment on the grounds of unreasonableness, since to do so would
have denied the plaintiff an effective remedy in that the Italian
court could not exercise "effective" jurisdiction in this in-
stance .9
This decision was undoubtedly correct, but it becomes
even more defensible if one hypothesizes a conflict of laws into
the facts and assumes that the Italian court could get effective
jurisdiction. Suppose that under Italian law there is no right
of action for breach of contract of carriage by denial of entry
onto a vessel, and suppose that the Louisiana rule is contrary.
Italy's policy would be to protect the assets of Italian carriers
from suits for mere denial of passage, presuming that the finan-
cial situation of the carrier is more important than the dis-
rupted plans of the traveller. Louisiana's policy, on the other
hand, is to allow those injured by an arbitrary breach of con-
tract to be compensated. Here Italy would have no interest in
applying its law to a situation involving a Louisiana defen-
dant-to do so would not advance the policy at all-nor would
application of Louisiana law undermine the policy since the
Italian carrier is not the defendant. On the contrary, Louisiana
has an interest in allowing its plaintiff to recover and is the only
state with an interest in applying its law to our hypothetical
situation. Of course, the chosen Italian court might itself
choose to apply Louisiana law, but absent a showing that it
would the Louisiana court would be justified in determining
the forum selection provision unreasonable on the sole ground
w 181 So. 2d 809 (La. App. 1966). See text accompanying notes 192-93, supra.
2' Id. at 810.
' Id. at 810-11.
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that only Louisiana had an interest in applying its law. 29'
It is fairly clear that the law to be applied by the chosen
forum can have significant consequences for the parties. The
application of such law can often encroach against significant
forum interests and thus render the choice of forum clause
unreasonable and unenforceable. In determining whether to
uphold a choice of forum, the nonchosen court should give
careful consideration to policies and interests underlying any
potentially conflicting laws to ensure that the proper law is
applied to the transaction as a part of the reasonableness test. -
B. Fairness to the Parties
In cases involving consensual transactions, courts must
generally consider the likelihood that the parties have relied
upon the law of a specific state. Thus, it would be "unfair" to
apply a law to the transaction which was unanticipated or
unforeseeable by the parties. 211 In the choice of forum situation,
however, it may be argued that the choice of law of the chosen
forum is never unforeseeable. In the freely negotiated agree-
ment, the parties must be presumed to know the choice of law
rules of the chosen forum, and one may fairly imply the parties'
consent to the employment of its choice of law rules. If this is
the only component of the concept of fairness to the parties,
any choice of law by the chosen forum pursuant to its articu-
lated choice of law rules would be foreseeable and fair.
However, there is another important element in determin-
ing fundamental fairness to the parties. This is the concept of
legislative jurisdiction, embodied in the rule that a state denies
due process of law9' to a party by applying its law where it has
2' For another example of a "false conflict" type case, see Roach v. Hapag-Lloyd,
A.G., 358 F. Supp. 481 (N.D. Calif. 1973), where the controversy was between a third-
party plaintiff and a third-party defendant both of whom were from the same state,
which was also the chosen forum, where the agreement was entered, where the contract
was performed, and where the alleged breach occurred. Professor Currie would say that
it would constitute a denial of due process for a court with no interest in the matter in
issue to apply its law in determination of that issue. See text accompanying note 295,
infra.
"I Sedler, supra note 190 at 306; citing as an example Denny v. American Tobacco
Co., 308 F. Supp. 219 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
"' U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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no factual contacts with the transaction294 or "no legitimate
interest in the application of its policy to the case at hand." '95
This could easily arise in a case such as Zapata,9 where the
chosen forum, England, had no factual contacts with the trans-
action and seemingly no interest in applying its law to the
transaction. It has already been noted that the British rule
could very well be that a choice of law is implied from a choice
of forum. 297 Would the potential application of English law to
a transaction with which it had no contacts besides being the
chosen forum be so unfair as to violate the due process rights
of the party resisting the effectuation of the choice of forum
provision so as to render the entire choice unreasonable and
thus unenforceable? The Restatement seems to give an affirm-
ative answer, although not one of constitutional dimension, by
its requirement that the state whose law is chosen by the par-
ties must have a reasonable relationship to the transaction.295
' Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930). See Felix, Diversity Jurisdiction
and Choice of Law: Of Strangers Bearing Stale Products Liability Claims, 25 S.CAR.L.
REv. 199, 210 (1973). Cf. Vita Food Products, Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co., Ltd., [1939]
A.C. 277 (P.C.), where Lord Wright, writing for the Judicial Committee of the English
Privy Council, in a case where all the parties had expressly chosen English law to
govern their contract even though the transaction had no factual contacts with Eng-
land, wrote that "[clonnection with English law is not as a matter of principle essen-
tial." Id. at 290.
"3 B. CURRIE, supra note 238, at 195. Professor Currie exhaustively discusses the
constitutionality of choice of law in ch. 2. The converse of the rule is that an interested
forum may constitutionally apply its law if such application is "fair" (read foreseeable)
to the other party. Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 (1964); B. CURRIE, supra
note 238, at ch. 2; Sedler, supra note 190, at 294; Sedler, The Territorial Imperative:
Automobile Accidents and the Significance of a State Line, 9 DuQ. L. REv. 394, 403
(1971). The problem of a completely disinterested forum can arise because of the
concept of "transient jurisdiction," Ehrenzweig, supra note 6, at 289, or of consent to
the jurisdiction of a completely unconnected forum, see text accompanying notes 264-
79, supra. Although "[h]istorically and analytically judicial jurisdiction and choice
of law are separable [and] [a]ccording to traditional doctrine the decision to hear a
case or not is unaffected by the choice of law to be applied in disposing of the case,"
Felix, supra note 294, at 207, there have been many calls to consolidate the two
concepts, e.g., Ehrenzweig, supra note 6, at 292; Traynor, supra note 3, at 663-64
(1959), both favored tightening the laws of judicial jurisdiction to conform with current
legislative jurisdiction notions. Cf. note 325, infra.
"I The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
217 See notes 137 and 235, supra.
"I RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLicT OF LAWS §187 (2)(a) (1971). The comment
to this subsection seems to believe this interpretation, however, when it notes that:
The parties to a multistate contract may have a reasonable basis for choosing
a state with which the contract has no substantial relationship. For example,
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In the absence of an express choice it is clear that a state with
no factual contacts or interest in applying its law could not be
the state of "the most significant relationship to the transac-
tion and the parties.""2 '
The question could be entirely academic for it actually
assumes that the chosen forum will apply its law or the law of
a similarly situated state3"' notwithstanding a lack of contacts
or interest and that it will ignore the contacts with and inter-
ests of other states. However, not all choice of law rules are
rational in that often the policies of interested states are ig-
nored and the law of a completely noninterested state is ap-
plied to the issue in question. 30' Again, it is an issue to which
attention should be given by any nonchosen court when it is
asked to uphold a forum selection agreement and dismiss an
action. The nonchosen forum faced with this problem would
have to predict what law the forum chosen by the parties would
apply. If the chosen forum would give due consideration to the
interests of the states involved and not apply its own law in the
absence of any interest in doing so, this would no longer be a
viable issue. But if the nonchosen forum's prediction is that
when contracting in countries whose legal systems are strange to them as well
as relatively immature, the parties should be able to choose a law on the
ground that they know it well and that it is sufficiently developed. For only
in this way can they be sure of knowing accurately the extent of their rights
and duties under the contract. So parties to a contract for the transportation
of goods by sea between two countries with relatively undeveloped legal
systems should be permitted to submit their contract to some well-known
and highly elaborated commercial law. Id. at Comment f [emphasis added].
As indicated by the emphasized portion, this rule still appears to restrict choice of the
law of a state with no substantial relationship to the situation where the states which
do have a substantial relationship have comparatively primitive legal systems which
are unfamiliar to the parties. The case cited in the Reporter's Note, however, Vita Food
Products, Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co., Ltd., [1939] A.C. 277 (P.C.), allowed a choice
of English law in a carriage of goods contract between Newfoundland and New York,
neither of whose legal systems could fairly be characterized as "relatively undevel-
oped." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §187, (Reporter's Notes) (1971).
See also UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §1-105, restricting express choice of law tojurisdic-
tions having a "reasonable relation" to the transaction.
"I RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188(1) (1971).
3w "A state may deprive a party due process of law by applying the law of a state
having no interest in the matter, whether the law applied is that of the forum of
another state." B. CURRIE, supra note 238, at 196 n. 295; citing Young v. Masci, 289
U.S. 253 (1933). But cf. EHRENZWEIG, at 12.
01 See, e.g., the discussion of the lex loci delecti rule in R. WEINTRAUB, supra note
18, at 210-19 and cases cited therein.
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significant interests of connected states will be ignored or that
the chosen forum would apply its own law notwithstanding the
lack of an interest in doing so (besides the fact that it was the
forum chosen by the parties), the court must consider whether
it would be fair, or indeed constitutionally permissible, to allow
the chosen forum to do so by giving effect to the forum stipula-
tion. That is, it is necessary for the nonchosen court to deter-
mine both that the chosen forum would apply the law of a state
without significant factual contacts or interest in applying its
law to the question at issue, and that such future or potential
action by the chosen court in choosing to apply what the non-
chosen court views as the wrong law renders the entire choice
of forum unreasonable.
There are three cases which are especially instructive in
any analysis of this issue. The first is the classic case of Home
Ins. Co. v. Dick,"2 in which a Mexican insurance company
issued an insurance policy in Mexico to a Mexican resident
covering damages to a certain ship so long as they occurred in
Mexican waters and providing that any losses were payable in
Mexico City.0 3 The policy included a clause which prohibited
actions under the policy brought more than a year after the
incident causing the damage. Before the loss occurred, the pol-
icy was assigned to Dick, a Mexican resident, who was never-
theless a Texas domiciliary. The limitation provision was valid
under Mexican law, but the Texas court in which Dick sued the
insurer held that the provision was rendered inoperative by a
Texas statute."4 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that
-2 281 U.S. 397 (1930). See the discussion in B. CURRIE, supra note 238, at 232-
33.
281 U.S. at 403-04.
Id. at 404-05. The statute, TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 5545 (1925) reads:
No person, firm, corporation, association or combination of whatsoever kind
shall enter into any stipulation, contract, or agreement, by reason whereof
the time in which to sue thereon is limited to a shorter period than two years.
And no stipulation, contract, or agreement for any such shorter limitation
in which to sue shall ever be valid in this state.
It is interesting to note how the action was maintained in Texas despite the fact that
the defendant had never done any business, and was not present, in Texas. Two New
York companies had reinsured part of the risk assumed by the defendant, Home
Insurance. The reinsurers were sued as garnishees on the theory that, if the claim was
established, they were indebted to Home Insurance, and it was these debts that were
attached in the quasi-in rem proceeding. The local agents of the garnishees were served
pursuant to Texas law. 281 U.S. at 402.
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application of the Texas law to a transaction with which Texas
had no factual contacts violated due process."5 As Professor
Currie said, "when a state having no interest in the matter
applies its law to the exclusion of the proffered law of an inter-
ested foreign state, due process is denied.""3 '
Another Supreme Court decision, decided prior to Dick,
also illuminates the legislative jurisdiction-due process aspect
of the fairness test. In New York Life Ins. Co. v. Head,317 the
Supreme Court held that application of Missouri law to an
insurance contract made in Missouri between parties from New
Mexico and New York violated due process." The Court ac-
knowledged the power of Missouri to govern aspects of the
contract related to its making,0 9 but refused to allow Missouri
law to govern on issues having nothing to do with the making
of the contract and which concerned only the subsequent con-
tractual relationship of the parties. Here the issue was whether
the Missouri law prohibiting forfeiture of insurance policies due
to default in repayment of loans obtained from the insurer
under the policy provisions could constitutionally be applied
although the original insurance contract had been entered into
in Missouri, the subsequent loan transaction had been accom-
plished elsewhere, and the parties were residents of other
states. The Court, then, recognized that merely because a con-
"' 281 U.S. at 407-08.
30 B. CURRIE, supra note 238, at 232. Professor Currie uses the term "interest" in
the sense of advancement of a policy underlying a rule of the state by its application,
or a subversion of such a policy by application of the law of another state. See gener-
ally, id., chs. 2 & 4.
301 234 U.S. 149 (1914). See the discussion in B. CURRIE, supra note 238, at 225-29.
m 234 U.S. at 161-62. The Court said that "[tihe principle .. . lies at the
foundation of the full faith and credit clause .... " id. at 161, but spoke in the
language of due process [e.g., "how far it was within the power of the State of Missouri
to extend its authority into the State of New York. . . ." 234 U.S. at 161], and cited
Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897), for the proposition that "a State may not
consistently with the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, extend its
authority beyond its legitimate jurisdiction . . . ." 234 U.S. at 162. Professor Currie
has contended that, in this area at least, the distinction between the two is meaningless
"because the essential principle underlying the operation of both clauses is the same
- . ." B. CURRI, supra note 238, at 195. He also says that the Court "equated" due
process and full faith and credit in New York Life Ins. Co. v. Head. Id. at 226.
3"' 234 U.S. at 160. Note, however, that the insurance contract specifically pro-
vided that it was issued in New York and should be dealt with as a New York contract.
Id. at 155-56.
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tract was made in a particular jurisdiction, 10 this does not give
that jurisdiction the power, in the due process sense, to govern
subsequent transactions under the contract which have no rela-
tionship to the place of making.3 1" In Professor Currie's words,
Missouri could not constitutionally apply its law on the issue
of whether there had been a forfeiture "since neither the in-
sured nor the beneficiary was a resident of Missouri, [and]
that state had no interest in the application of its nonforfeiture
policy. ' '312
Finally, in John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 313
another life insurance contract case, everything significant
happened in New York-the policy was applied for, issued and
delivered there, the insured and beneficiary were New York
residents when the policy became effective and when the in-
sured died there. The action was brought in Georgia, however,
after the widow moved there following the insured's death.'"
The insurer defended in the Georgia action by proving that the
insured had made material misrepresentations in the policy
3,, An occurrence that some would undoubtedly characterize as "fortuitous."
"I The Court's precise language in framing the general issue is instructive:
...the power of the State of Missouri to extend the operation of its statutes
beyond its borders into the jurisdiction of other States, so as in such other
States to destroy or impair the right of persons not citizens of Missouri to
contract, although the contract could in no sense be operative in Missouri
and although the contract was sanctioned by the law of the State where
made. That is to say, the right of a State where a contract concerning a
particular subject matter not in its essence intrinsically and inherently local
is once made within its borders not merely to legislate concerning acts done
or agreements made within the state in the future concerning such original
contract, but to affect the parties to such original contract with a perpetual
contractual paralysis following them outside of the jurisdiction of the State
of original contract by prohibiting them from doing any act or making any
agreement concerning the original contract not in accord with the law of the
State where the contract was originally made. In other words. . . , we must
consider the validity of the loan agreement, that is, how far it was within
the power of the State of Missouri to extend its authority into the State of
New York and there forbid the parties, one of whom was a citizen of New
Mexico and the other a citizen of New York, from making such loan agree-
ment in New York simply because it modified a contract originally made in
Missouri.
234 U.S. at 160-61.
'" B. CURRIE, supra note 238, at 226.
313 299 U.S. 178 (1936). See the discussion in B. CuRIuE, supra note 238, at 235-
3" 299 U.S. at 179.
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application, which under New York law rendered the policy
completely ineffective. The Georgia court, however, applied
the Georgia rule permitting the jury to determine whether the
misrepresentations were material and whether the agent's
knowledge of the misrepresentations would be imputed to the
company so that it would be held to have waived them."5 The
state court had supported this application of Georgia law by
reasoning that the issue of materiality was only a question of
the remedy rather than the validity of the contract and held
the law of the forum could be applied. 36 The Supreme Court
dismissed the remedy rationale quickly by noting that the de-
fense involved "a substantive right conferred by a statute of
New York, '317 and held that Georgia's failure to recognize this
substantive defense denied full faith and credit to the laws of
a sister state."1 8 Professor Currie cites Yates as illustrative of
the rule that a state may not constitutionally apply its law on
a matter over which it has no interest,39 and the court in Yates
cited Dick for the proposition that "there was no occurrence,
nothing done, to which the law of Georgia could apply. '320
It is fairly clear, then, that if in the Zapata situation the
chosen forum applied a law of a state which had neither signifi-
cant factual contacts with the transaction nor an interest in
having its law applied on the matter in issue, due process would
be denied. Note once again that in order for this to affect the
nonchosen court which is asked to dismiss pursuant to a choice
of forum agreement, that court must believe that the potential-
ity that the chosen forum will apply the improper law in the
due process sense renders the choice of forum unreasonable.
What should a nonchosen court do, then, when faced with
"' Id. at 179-80.
3" Id. at 181-82.
1,7 Id. at 182.
3,1 Id. at 183. Presumably, the Georgia court should have directed a verdict for the
insurance company.
31, B. Cuami, supra note 238, at 236:
It is manifest that Georgia had no interest in the application to this case of
any policy to be found in its laws. When the contract was entered into, and
at all times until the insured died, the parties and the transaction were
beyond the legitimate reach of whatever policy Georgia may have had.
31 234 U.S. at 182. This language, and the citation of Dick, buttresses Professor
Currie's contention that the two constitutional provisions, full faith and credit and due
process, are coterminous in this context. See note 308, supra.
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the Zapata situation in which it is reasonably sure that the
chosen forum would apply its own law even though it had nei-
ther factual contacts with the transaction nor any apparent
interest in applying its law on the relevant issue save that it
was the forum chosen by the parties? This could be reduced to
an inquiry into whether the mere choice of forum by the parties
for their transaction is a sufficient factual contact or gives it
an interest in applying its law on the point in question. There
is no direct authority either way in answer to this question,32
but Dick,322 Head,2 3 and Yates324 all seem to indicate that
judicial jurisdiction to decide a cause does not concomitantly
bestow legislative jurisdiction for the state to apply its law to
an issue with which it has no contacts or interest.32 What more
does a choice of forum provision do to the chosen forum than
submit to its judicial jurisdiction; what other effect does it have
besides prorogation? 326 It should add no factual contacts, and
certainly does not constitute a sufficient contact in the consti-
tutional sense. A fortiori, the forum qua forum would have no
interest in applying its law to an issue simply because it has
been designated by the parties as the exclusive forum. Only
when the rule of law sought to be applied concerns a strong
forum policy in procedural matters or would hinder judicial
administration should the forum qua forum have a legitimate
interest in applying its law to a matter with which it has no
factual connection. 27 Furthermore, if the fact that a contract
' But see Vita Food Products, Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co., Ltd., [1939] A.C. 277
(P.C.), discussed in note 294, supra.
3n Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
in New York Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U.S. 149 (1914).
2I John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178 (1936).
12 In this respect, the concepts of judicial jurisdiction and legislative jurisdic-
tion-or the ability of a state to apply its law to an issue-are completely separable.
Cf. note 48, supra, which is the converse of this proposition in that the commentators
there proposed restricting judicial jurisdiction to coincide with current notions of legis-
lative jurisdiction, whereas if one accepted the argument that the mere fact of judicial
jurisdiction simultaneously conferred legislative jurisdiction, one would be forced to
concede a great expansion in the current concepts of legislative jurisdiction up to the
limits of judicial jurisdiction.
"" See the discussion of the prorogatory effect of a choice of court stipulation, text
accompanying notes 11-17, supra.
2 B. CURRIE, supra note 238, at 236; Sedler, The Erie Outcome Test as a Guide
to Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws, 37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 813, 822-23
(1962), which also discusses various rules which do give the forum qua forum an
interest in applying its law because of the policies identified in the text.
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was made within a state does not give the state sufficient con-
tact or interest to apply its law on issues not concerning the
making of the agreement," 8 merely being a designated forum,
a relatively less significant contact, could not do so either.',
Perhaps we are taking the wrong approach. Conceivably in
the narrow confines of the choice of forum problem there need
not be a relationship between the law to be applied by the
chosen forum and the transaction. It would certainly not be
unfair in the sense of undue surprise as has been indicated
above. May there not be an exception to the factual connection
or interest requirement in the choice of forum context when
extraordinary circumstances exist? The Restatement (Second)
of the Conflict of Laws seems to carve out just such an excep-
tion in the situation of an express choice of law when the par-
ties are unfamiliar with the laws of the connected states and
the legal systems of the connected states are "relatively imma-
ture.""33 This exception, however, is too narrow, and the case
cited by the Reporter's Note to support the proposition, Vita
Food Products, Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co., Ltd.,"' bears this
out. In Vita Food the English Privy Council upheld an express
choice of English law to govern a carriage of goods transaction
between Newfoundland and New York, neither of which has a
legal system that could fairly be characterized as "relatively
undeveloped." Although the Restatement and Vita Food deal
with an express choice of law, this is immaterial. The same
considerations would apply in the absence of an express choice
of law so long as there is an express choice of forum because of
the presumption that the parties knew the choice of law rule
of the chosen forum. 3 2
In New York Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U.S. 149, 161-62 (1914).
31 Cf. Vita Food Products, Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co., Ltd., [1939] A.C. 277
(P.C.), discussed in note 294, supra.
- RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS §187, Comment f, (1971). For text of
the comment, see note 298, supra.
331 [1939] A.C. 277 (P.C.). See also Duskin v. Pennsylvania-Central Airlines
Corp., 167 F. 2d 727 (6th Cir. 1948), cert. denied 335 U.S. 829 (1948); Gantt v. Felipe
Y. Carlos Hurtado & Cia., Ltda., 297 N.Y. 433, 79 N.E. 2d 815 (1948) (procedural
characterization).
332 Unless, of course, the chosen forum changed its choice of law rule after the
contract was entered or in the case between the parties themselves, which would be
unpredictable by the nonchosen court.
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If there is such an exception, the question becomes what
are the extraordinary circumstances which will bring the ex-
ception into play? Certainly, the Restatement hypothetical in
which the connected states have law that is unfamiliar to the
parties and comparatively primitive legal systems33 3 would be
sufficient. Is it not just as reasonable to extend the exception
to situations in which there are several laws which could con-
ceivably apply or where the parties desire a neutral forum and
neutral law? It has been posited that "[n]eutrality of forum
is a traditional admiralty doctrine in situations where litigants
have no common nationality and their case involves maritime
law, '34 and the experience of certain courts, especially British
courts, in admiralty matters is also well known so that these
courts are often contractually designated to decide maritime
matters.35 There is no reason for these factors not to have equal
force in nonmaritime situations. Perhaps the rule should be
that whenever parties from different states enter into a con-
tract which has contacts with two or more states, the state
whose law is chosen to govern the transaction either by the
parties or by the chosen forum in the absence of an express
choice, should not be required to have a substantial connection
with the transaction or a legitimate interest in applying its law
provided that good reason exists to dispense with the require-
ment. Good reason would include such circumstances as: 1)
Unfamiliarity by the parties of the laws of the connected states,
2) the undeveloped state of the legal systems of the connected
states, 3) a particular need for a neutral forum, such as where
several laws could apply and "none has a clear exclusive claim
to control,"' 3 or 4) a particular need for a forum with expertise
in the type of transaction entered. Perhaps the exception
should be limited to "international" contracts. 37 At any rate,
See note 330, supra.
Comment, 6 N.Y.U. J. INT'L. L. & POL. 369, 375 (1973), citing The Belgenland,
114 U.S. 355 (1885).
Comment, 6 N.Y.U. J. INTr'L. L. & POL. 369, 375 (1973), citing The Bremen v.
Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1972).
334 Yntema, supra note 143,.at 356-57.
13 For the definition of an "international" contract, see note 1, supra. This would
at least be consistent with Professor Ehrenzweig's desire to totally separate the treat-
ment of international and interstate conflicts. See, e.g., Ehrenzweig, Interstate and
International Conflicts: A Plea for Segregation, 41 MINN. L. REv. 717 (1957);
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these are merely guides, for any sort of circumstance which
would indicate a need for certainty, neutrality, expertise, or the
like, should suffice. Again, this seems to be a return to a varia-
tion of the "reasonableness" test.
There must be, however, some limitation of this exception;
for example one limit might be provided by the adhesion con-
tract consideration in the test for the reasonableness of the
choice of forum provision.33 However, the most significant dan-
ger would be when the parties attempted to evade obligatory
requirements of the law of an interested or factually connected
state-the concept of fraud on the law.311 Again, however, this
could be avoided through proper consideration by the noncho-
sen court of the law to be applied by the chosen forum and its
consequent refusal to give effect to the forum selection provi-
sion where the chosen forum would apply a law which would
subvert a legitimate policy of any interested state.34 As Walter
Wheeler Cook put it: "Unless those consequences were of a
kind regarded as contrary to public policy as envisaged by the
forum. . . it would seem that this type of agreement might be
enforced." 341
It should be clear, then, that under the exception promul-
gated in this paper, the court confronted with the Zapata situa-
tion-where it could predict that the chosen forum would apply
the law of a state which had neither factual contacts nor a
legitimate interest in applying its law on the matter in
issue-could proceed and uphold the choice of forum where the
necessary circumstances justifying the exception exist. Zapata
would present no real problem given that the parties are from
different states and given the need for neutrality and expertise
in the forum. It will ultimately be up to the courts to establish
the parameters of the exception. Again, however, the mere con-
sideration of the relevant policies and interests involved insures
a more just adjudication.
EHRENZWEIG, at §6; cf. Scoles, Interstate and International Distinctions in Conflicts of
Laws in the United States, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1599, 1622 (1966).
3" See text accompanying notes 161-69, supra.
"' Yntema, supra note 143 at 354.
'~' See the discussion in subsection VIII D, supra.
Wd . COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 411-12 (1942).
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IX. POST Zapata CASES AND ANALYSIS OF THE RULE
In the brief time since Zapata was handed down, several
other courts have had to consider and decide whether to give
effect to choice of forum provisions. A brief look at these cases
is instructive and does nothing to counter the contention that
the reasonableness test approach is rapidly becoming the pre-
ferred position.
In Furbee v. Vantage Press, Inc.,342 the plaintiff and defen-
dant were author and publisher, respectively, and had entered
into a contract for the publication and distribution of a book
with a choice of forum clause designating New York state
courts. In contravention of this agreement, the plaintiff sued in
federal court alleging fraudulent inducement to make the con-
tract. The basis of jurisdiction was diversity of citizenship;
federal substantive law was not involved. The publisher de-
fended under the choice of forum stipulation, and the district
court dismissed pursuant to the forum limitation agreement.
The District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the dismissal on
appeal, indicating that the choice of forum would be upheld if
reasonable. 143 The court determined the chosen forum was rea-
sonable on several grounds, including: (1) That the parties had
designated that New York law would govern regarding forma-
tion and construction, (2) that it was the parties' residence, (3)
that New York was the place of execution and performance,
and (4) that it was the location of both parties and most, if not
all, witnesses.3 4 Since New York had "substantial contacts"
with the transaction, its designation as an exclusive forum was
not unreasonable. Of course, the outcome might (and probably
would) be different if federal substantive law had been in-
volved since it would have given the forum qua forum more of
an interest in deciding the issue.
Roach v. Hapag-Lloyd, A. G.,34 was a federal district court
case which also applied the Zapata reasonableness rule. Here,
a longshoreman was injured when goods fell from a ship onto
him. He sued the German corporate owners of the vessel, who
342 464 F.2d 835 (D.C.Cir. 1972).
31 Id. at 836.
34 Id. at 837.
2' 358 F. Supp. 481 (N.D. Calif. 1973).
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in turn impleaded the packager of the goods, Peiver, a German
corporation, as a third-party defendant. 46 Peiver defended on
a choice of forum clause in the bill of lading which selected
German courts and moved to dismiss the third-party com-
plaint. Hapag argued that the situation was covered by the
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act347 and that Indussa38 would
therefore apply to void the choice of forum provision. The dis-
trict court, however, refused to follow Indussa finding instead
that the injury was not to the goods but rather to a person, and
holding that the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act was therefore
inapplicable. 49 The court then indicated that a choice of forum
is prima facie valid unless unreasonable, and applied the rea-
sonableness test, citing Zapata, determining that the choice of
forum was not unreasonable in this instance. The court noted
the substantial contacts of the transaction between owner and
packager to Germany-both were German corporations, and
the breach in packaging, if any, occurred in Germany-but
said that it was a close case since all witnesses to the accident
were in the United States. However, the court held that Hapag
had not met its burden to "clearly show" that the clause would
operate unjustly and unreasonably, and so it dismissed the
third-party action. 50 The case could be explained by the obser-
vation that since the parties to the choice of forum agreement
were both foreigners who had chosen the courts of their state
of incorporation, the court's protective instincts for its own
citizens, a potent consideration in many of these cases, was
absent. However, this interpretation is counter to explicit lan-
guage in the opinion.
Spatz v. Nascone35' considered the novel question of the
extent to which the parties will be allowed to preclude exercise
of jurisdiction by federal courts in favor of state courts through
a choice of forum clause. In Spatz, the parties entered into a
contract in which the defendant agreed to construct a shopping
31 For third-party implications, see Matthiesson v. National Trailer Convoy, Inc.,
294 F. Supp. 1132 (D. Minn. 1968), discussed at notes 204-06, supra.
-m 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-15 (1970).
31 Indussa Corp. v. S.S. Ranborg, 377 F. 2d 200 (2d Cir. 1967). See text accompa-
nying notes 77-79, supra.
' 358 F. Supp. at 483-84.
Id. at 484.
"' 364 F. Supp. 967 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
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center on land in New York and sell it to the plaintiff. The
contract included a choice of forum provision designating
Pennsylvania state courts and an express choice of law clause
selecting Pennsylvania law. A dispute arose as to the tax liabil-
ity on the property and plaintiff sued in Pennsylvania federal
district court. Defendant moved for dismissal on the basis of
the choice of forum agreement. The plaintiff countered by
arguing that to deprive them of a forum in federal court would
deprive them of "substantial constitutional and statutory
rights."3"2 The court, quoting extensively from Zapata, indi-
cated that the principle of the latter case-prima facie validity
of the choice of forum unless unreasonable-would apply to a
situation in which the choice of forum selected a state court
over a federal court with concurrent diversity jurisdiction. That
is to say that the federal diversity jurisdiction statute5 3 does
not give parties "an absolute right to maintain a suit under the
circumstances therein set forth" '354 and is therefore not within
the exception providing that a choice of forum will not be en-
forced which limits a statutory right to litigate in a particular
forum. Under the reasonableness test, the court determined
that the record failed to show that the choice of forum provision
was unreasonable, unjust, unfair, or seriously inconvenient,
and so gave effect to the provision and dismissed the suit. 5"
In Air Economy Corp. v. Aero-Flow Dynamics, Inc., "' a
New Jersey court upheld the application of the reasonableness
test to a choice of forum clause. The plaintiff had agreed to sell
its business to defendant, and the contract of sale included a
forum selection provision naming the New York County, New
York, courts and choosing to apply New York law. Neither
plaintiff nor defendant were New Jersey corporations although
the business was located in New Jersey. In a brief per curiam
opinion, the court applied the reasonableness test and enforced
the choice of forum agreement citing the Restatement (Second)
of Conflict of Laws § 80 and Maryland Casualty.357
31 Id. at 974.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1970).
3 364 F. Supp. at 975.
Id. at 981. See also Brown v. Gingiss Int'l., Inc., 360 F. Supp. 1042 (E.D. Wis.
1973); text accompanying notes 175-79 supra.
4" 300 A.2d 856 (N.J. Super. 1973).
"I Central Contracting Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 367 F. 2d 341 (3d Cir. 1966).
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In another state court decision, Fidelity & Deposit Co. v.
Gainesville Iron Works, Inc.,35 a Georgia appellate court ap-
plied the traditional common law approach to choice of forum
agreements calling the reasonableness test approach of
Maryland Casualty a "minority viewpoint. '311 However, even
though the court refused to apply the modern approach, it is
probable that the correct result was reached. In this case, the
supplier of labor and materials furnished in construction of a
courthouse in Columbus-Muscogee County, Georgia sued the
general contractor's surety for payment under the surety bond.
The surety agreement had a choice of forum clause limiting
actions thereunder to political subdivisions where the project
was located. Plaintiff sued in Hall County, Georgia and
defendant-surety defended under the choice of forum stipula-
tion.30 The court held that the state venue law concerning
actions against insurers30' gave claimants several alternative
choices, and that a limitation of that alternative by agreement
was unenforceable because contrary to public policy.62 Al-
though the language condemning the modern approach is un-
fortunate, the opinion is perfectly consistent with it since there
is a statutory alternative provided. 63 Furthermore, it also in-
volved the special case of an insurer, thereby conceivably pro-
viding good reason not to apply the presumptive validity posi-
tion. However, the Georgia appellate court in a subsequent
decision indicated that it held to the position that contractual
forum selection provisions are invalid.3 64
In retrospect, the reasonableness test has been applied by
most courts in a predictable and somewhat conventional man-
ner. Absent an inequality of bargaining power resulting in over-
reaching or an adhesion contract, courts seem to judge reasona-
bleness by a rough analogy to the localizing rules of the
' 189 S.E.2d 130 (Ga. App. 1972).
" Id. at 131.
31 Id. at 130-31.
' , GA. CODE § 56-1201 (1972).
3Z 189 S.E.2d at 131.
"' See text accompanying notes 219-25, supra.
38 Cartridge Rental Network v. Video Entertainment, Inc., 209 S.E. 2d 132 (Ga.
App. 1974), "The rationale of that case [Gainesville Iron Works] was not solely con-
fined to the statute therein involved but was based on broad considerations of public
policy against limiting venue by contract." Id. at 133.
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Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. Basically, if the
chosen forum has significant factual contacts with the transac-
tion, the court will find the choice to be reasonable and enforce
the agreement to limit litigation to the chosen forum. For in-
stance, in Furbee v. Vantage Press, Inc., 65 the District of Col-
umbia Court of Appeals upheld a choice of forum provision to
be reasonable when the chosen forum had "substantial con-
tacts" with the performance and execution of the contract. 6
In Furbee the chosen forum was New York, New York law was
chosen by the parties to govern the formation and construction
of the contract, it was the parties' residence, it was the place
of execution and performance, and the location of the parties
and witnesses.5 .
The remaining question is how many factual contacts
must there be for a chosen forum to have a significant relation-
ship and render the choice reasonable? Zapata indicates that
the chosen forum need have no factual contacts with the trans-
action besides being selected by the parties where the parties
are of equal bargaining power. It is probable that the courts will
require more factual contacts where the bargaining power of
the parties begins to become more unequal, applying a sort of
balancing test. The basic concern is that the parties obtain a
fair and complete hearing.
The prima facie validity-reasonableness test approach
seems to be the clear trend and the preferred position. Its appli-
cation is required in admiralty cases and implied in other areas
controlled by federal law.68 Moreover, it is being adopted more
and more by the state courts. It would be well to proceed some-
what cautiously, however; automatic acceptance and enforce-
ment of choice of forum clauses would be as harmful as the
traditional view of near automatic rejection and courts should
give due consideration to reasonableness and fairness to pre-
vent abuse. One commentator has noted:
us 464 F.2d 835 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
3" Id. at 837. See text accompanying notes 342-44, supra.
"' Id.
" See Reese, supra note 11, at 537. Professor Reese continues by writing: "The
Supreme Court's decision in the Zapata case is not of constitutional dimension and
hence does not have binding force in areas governed by state law. It should, however,
have substantial influence upon the state courts because of the lucidity of its reason-
ing, the prestige of the court, and the time of its rendition." Id.
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Even outside the contract of adhesion field, abuse of such
clauses is widespread. [citations omitted]. In today's econ-
omy, equal bargaining power cannot be "presumed." Zapata
will render a disservice to sound development of the law if it
leads to a choice-of-court-clauses epidemic2"
Properly applied, the reasonableness test is flexible enough to
allow courts to consider forum selection clauses in the light of
basic equitable principles of individualization of justice, good
faith, and relief from hardship while at the same time promot-
ing the public policy of expanding freedom of contract and
party autonomy. Choice of forum clauses are an important
element in promoting more certainty and stability in interna-
tional and interstate contracts as well as allowing parties to
fashion dispute resolution procedures to more nearly fit their
needs. These attributes must inevitably encourage an increase
in international and interstate contractual arrangements, con-
sequently increasing international trade, and most impor-
tantly, international understanding.
"I Nadelman, supra note 33, at 134. See also Bergman, Contractual Restrictions
on the Forum, 48 CALF. L. REv. 438 (1960).
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